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ased on a sample of 15 European countries, this survey analyses various features of the 
European IPO (Initial Public Offering) market over the period from 1995 to 2004: 
listing requirements, IPO-mechanism choices, performance and secondary market 
liquidity. 
First, the comparison of national primary market regulations, in spite of the commonly observed 
segmentation between Main, Parallel and New Markets, shows a wide diversity in listing 
requirements and reveals that the primary market’s mechanisms are almost always monitored by 
investment banks, which then control the initial pricing and allocation of new issues. The 
examination of issuers’ practices looks at the increase in the different types of IPO mechanisms 
in the late nineties and the widespread use of the book-building mechanism nowadays. 
Second, our empirical analysis of IPO short-term and long-term performance confirms, with a 
few exceptions, widely recognised patterns, but also show discrepancies between countries, 
periods, sector and primary listing mechanisms. The average initial underpricing amounts to 
22% over our pan-European sample and is observed at various levels in each of the 15 countries 
of the sample. Empirical evidence on long-term performance is less clear. Results are not 
benchmark-dependent but sometimes differ from one measurement method to another. 
However, in line with previous studies, significant underperformance is found at the 3-year 
horizon with all methodologies and in all countries, except Greece and Portugal. 
Finally, using a sample of IPOs launched on Euronext between 1995 and 2004, our study 
examines the relationship between initial returns and post-listing liquidity in the short and in the 
long-run. We support the ‘illiquidity-compensation hypothesis’. Initial underpricing is 
positively linked to information asymmetry in the after-market. It produces higher turnover 
immediately after the IPO but has no effect on trading volumes after the first year of trading, so 
that this liquidity effect cannot be put down to ownership structure but is more likely 
attributable to the interest underpriced stocks generate. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the market for initial public offerings (IPOs) in Europe has been characterised 
by several important developments. Two major characteristics of this period are the out-
performance of ‘new economy’ IPOs and the growth of book-building as the favourite choice 
among IPO underwriting procedures. Another striking feature of the landscape of European 
IPOs is its ‘cyclicality’. In the late 90s, the growth of the internet bubble induced a large number 
of new economy firms to go public, resulting in a hot issue market from 1998 to 2000. This 
IPO-euphoria period was also characterised by high levels of initial returns, meaning that most 
IPO companies “left money on the table”.
1 Nevertheless, since 2000, with the substantial 
decline of most New Markets, primary markets have become more apathetic than ever on most 
stock exchanges. Finally, with the introduction of the euro in twelve European countries, 
investors in new listings tend to establish their financial strategies at a European level instead of 
clustering in national markets. 
For these reasons, the objective of our study, based on a sample of 2,104 European domestic 
companies that went public between 1995 and 2004 in 15 different countries, is to provide an 
updated view of the European IPO market, and in particular, to provide answers to the following 
questions. 
-  What are the current differences between the European and the US IPO market? 
-  Has the decline of growth markets since 2000 changed the characteristics of the IPO market 
and the practices of issuing firms? 
-  What are the rationales and consequences of the rise of the book-building procedure for 
underwriting IPOs? 
-  Has the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) had an effect on the performance of IPOs in 
the eurozone? 
-  Are there national discrepancies in Europe? 
-  How does adverse selection explain underpricing of IPOs? 
-  Is post-IPO liquidity related to the issued stock’s initial and long term performance? 
The first part of this paper documents the IPO mechanisms available on European exchanges, 
compares listing requirements and establishes which of the IPO procedures are most used by 
European issuers. The second part focuses on short-run and long-run performance of IPOs and 
the economic determinants of performance. Finally, in the third part IPO-performance variables 
are related to the choice of introduction mechanism as well as to microstructure factors such as 
information asymmetry and post-IPO liquidity. 
I.  The European institutional framework of IPOs 
Unlike the United States
2, the institutional setting of European IPOs is not overseen by a single 
regulator but by a patchwork of distinct national regulators whose only common duty, when 
belonging to the European Union, is to issue regulations in accordance with the legal guidelines 
                                                      
1 Ritter (1991) defines “money left on the table in an IPO…as the number of shares offered multiplied by 
the first day capital gain, measured from the offer price to the closing price”. 
2 See also Ritter (2003) for a short review of the main differences between European and American IPO 
markets. of the European Investment Services Directive
3 (1993), the Prospectus Directive
4 (2003), and 
the Transparency Directive
5 (2004). As things currently stand, the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) is working on co-ordinating the regulations of the 25 members of 
the EU but this process has not yet resulted in an effective set of common rules for primary 
stock markets, apart from the Prospectus Directive. Therefore, our objective is to provide a 
synthesis of these separate regulations with a focus on common features and specificities. Given 
the vast number of IPOs in Europe, we have chosen to focus on the stock exchange procedures 
and activities of 15 representative countries. The London Stock Exchange (LSE), Euronext and 
Deutsche Börse are chosen since they are the three biggest stock exchanges in Europe. We 
include other exchanges with an active primary stock market, i.e. Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, 
Finland, Italy and Spain. Finally, we also look at available IPO data from three emerging 
markets and Eastern European stock exchanges where a substantial quantity of IPOs result from 
privatisations, Greece, Turkey and Poland. Thus, our panel of countries consists of Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom, among which, according to Sentis 
(2004), Spain, Finland, Sweden, Greece and the United Kingdom ranked among the first 15 
countries in the world in terms of the rate of IPOs, calculated as the ratio of the number of IPOs 
reported to the total number of listed firms on the exchange during the period 1995-2002. 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 report the total number of domestic new listings, the funds raised by newly 
listed domestic companies, and their market value, per year, for each of the 15 countries. These 
statistics are retrieved mainly from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) website. The 
countries in our sample show the effects of a hot market period from 1998 to 2000, with a sharp 
downturn in 2001 and a very low listing activity in the years after 2000. For a few countries 
(France, Belgium, Sweden, Poland), the hot period started in 1997. There are four countries that 
do not match the general pattern. First, on emerging markets like the Polish, the Turkish and to a 
lesser extent the Greek market, 1995 and 1996 were also active periods. Second, the British 
market is characterised by a flatter pattern, with the only peak year being 2000. 
The basic features of the going public process that are common to all countries are described in 
sub-section I.1. In each of the 15 countries of our survey, any firm willing to undertake an IPO 
on a regulated market must first obtain permission from a regulatory body which can be the 
Ministry of Finance, the regulatory authority of security markets, or the stock exchange itself, 
depending on the country. The permission is conditional on the fact that the issuing firm meet 
certain criteria in terms of size, float capitalisation, age, etc. These listing requirements are 
detailed in sub-section I.2. To achieve floatation, firms generally have a choice among various 
initial pricing methods which can be divided into three categories: auctions, fixed-price 
offerings and book-building procedures. These methods are described in sub-section I.3, which 
also provides figures on the popularity of these methods over the past ten years. 
 
                                                      
3 The 1993 Investment Services Directive (ISD) sets the legislative framework for investment firms and 
securities markets in the EU, providing for a single passport for investment services. 
4 The Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC (PD) sets out the initial disclosure obligations for issuers of 
securities that are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market in the EU. It provides 
a passport for issuers that enables them to raise capital across the EU on the basis of a single prospectus. 
5 The Transparency Directive establishes rules for the disclosure of periodic financial reports and of major 
shareholdings for companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in the EU. A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 3 
Table 1. IPOs: Number per year and per country domestic firms only - investment funds excluded 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Austria  424247  638 2 4 2
Belgium*  1 3 13 18 17 7 
France  22 59 82 226 68 76 
Netherlands  6 7 15 22 17 9 
Portugal  1 657 1 054  
36 15 14 20 800
Finland  1 0 71 21 22 71 9  9 2 0 1 9 9
Germany  20 20 35 67 134 134 21 6 0 6 443
Greece  18 20 12 23 37 52 21 15 13 9 220
Italy  12 15 13 21 33 48 18 13 10 9 192
Poland  21 18 62 57 28 13 9 5 5 32 250
Spain**  0478 1 05  211 2 4 0
Sweden  16 17 50 32 47 44 19 8 4 5 242
Switzerland  6 6 13 17 17 23 14 5 1 3 105
Turkey  30 25 29 20 9 36 1 5 4 12 171
United Kingdom  285 347 217 169 161 366 236 219 194 413 2,607
Total  467 555 571 704 614 843 392 297 254 514 5,211
General source: WFE (WFE European statistics are originally provided by FESE.) 
*Source: WFE for 1996-2004, Euronext Brussels for 1995. 
**Source: Bolsa de Madrid. 
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Table 2. IPOs: New capital raised per year and per country- investment funds excluded 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Austria  1,421 99 2,732 118 609 2,013  500 1,146 1,496 1,900 12,034
Belgium  136 832 487 1,003 2,178 7,163 
France  153 957 7,332 12,283 6,923 11,663 
Netherlands  3,954 3,004 7,011 13,821 21,222 28,972 
Portugal  0  0000 4 6 0  
39,148* 3,696* 600* 9,642* 182,640*
Finland  40 91 545 342 238 628  0 0 0 0 1,885
Germany  3,537 10,332 2,528 3,228 12,964 25,556  2,882 214 0 6 61,247
Greece  60 337 60 919 899 2,843  1,060 92 61 95 6,426
Italy  3,645 1,611 818 578 1,436 6,807 4,383 1,986 550 2,630 24,444-
Poland  297 39 261 208 107 335  1 2 0 2251 3,501
Spain**  na 1,004 926 4,829 25,151 67,532  19,230 5,690 10,938 21,658 156,959
Sweden  1,806 2,514 1,259 514 538 10,881  301 3,631 0 1,039 22,483
Switzerland  1,395 670 1,664 9,258 9,769 24,361  2,624 8 0 1,530 51,279
Turkey  12 22 76 128 85 2729  0 667 383 1,336 5,437
United Kingdom  3,375 14,293 1,074 5,692 7,355 15,186 10,791 8,229 6,546 10,644 83,186
Source: WFE (WFE European statistics are originally provided by FESE.) 
Statistics include domestic firms only and exclude investment funds. All figures are in €. 
* Statistics for all Euronext. 
** Statistics for BME. 
na: not available. A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 5 
Table 3. IPOs: End-of-year market value per year and per country domestic firms only- investment funds excluded 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 2004 Total
Austria  2,732 125 642 2,044 570 55 4,637 76 10,881
Belgium  3,109 5,461 4,754 16,941
France  37,019 41,821 29,003 54,820
Netherlands  7,011 12,829 30,004 28,972
Portugal  2,539 1,306 3,192 46,076
109,640* 7,620* 919* 26,582*
469,618
Finland  1,478 2,800 10,852 8,160 1,881 17,801 988 317 44,277
Germany  2,526 3,278 12,964 25,556 2,882 223 0 1,996 49,425
Greece  354 177 307 1,391 9,847 796 645 392 13,909
Italy  3,065 14,270 84,930 50,023 10,586 19,971 33,664 71,111 287,620
Poland  5,488 8,959 3,414 1,549 647 111 338 8,693 29,198
Spain**  na 10,136 25,151 406 116 136 94 186 36,224
Sweden  11,843 7,159 58,928 46,456 5,805 2,871 613 1,322 134,998
Switzerland  9,583 9,249 9,769 19,682 6,609 2,023 1,270 1,530 59,715
Turkey  285 256 85 3 0 201 30 1,428 2,287
United Kingdom  100,097 67,811 125,537 336,690 168,603 93,397 52,661 38,606 983,403
Source: WFE (WFE European statistics are originally provided by FESE).  
Statistics include domestic firms only and exclude investment funds. All figures are in €. 
* Statistics for all Euronext 
** Statistics for BME 6 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
1.  The current stock exchange listing process 
A request for a stock exchange listing must be made on the basis of an introduction prospectus 
whose contents are subject to regulation and which is generally filed a few months (120 days on 
average according to Schuster (2003)) before the admission date. Typically, a universal or an 
investment bank, called ‘the underwriter’, is involved in developing the admission statement 
and is in charge of the underwriting and floatation process. The underwriter is chosen by the 
IPO candidate after a so-called ‘beauty contest’ at which banks or other financial institutions 
present their proposals for the IPO. For most IPOs, the underwriter assembles a banking 
syndicate, i.e. a combination of several banks or financial institutions. As the ‘lead manager’, 
the underwriter is responsible for implementing the IPO while other members of the syndicate 
only undertake underwriting or placement functions. The banks that make up the syndicate are 
also selected through a ‘beauty contest’ in which individual banks present their estimates of the 
firm’s value, the issue price, the demand for the issuer’s shares as well as the costs of the issue. 
In order to compile the IPO prospectus, lawyers, together with the underwriting bank, conduct 
due diligence, that is an examination of the company regarding its legal, financial, and 
commercial aspects. The legal due diligence includes an examination of the company’s major 
contracts, liabilities, patents and other legal facts. The commercial due diligence contains an 
analysis of the issuing company’s fields of business, market positions, development strategies, 
human resources, management, etc. Financial due diligence entails financial statements, 
auditors’ reports for cases in which audited accounts are required, investment planning, etc. 
While due diligence is exclusively for internal use, it serves as a basis for the offering 
prospectus, which, at the minimum, contains information on the shares to be admitted, general 
information about the issuer and associated companies, a description of the issuer’s business 
activities, a presentation of the issuer’s net assets, financial position and results of operations. 
The actual minimum content of the admission document and listing requirements are usually 
defined by the regulatory body of the primary market and differ from country to country (cf. 
I.2). 
The next step of the floatation process is to obtain the approval of the admission authority, i.e. 
the market supervisor or the exchange itself or both. Lastly, the initial pricing and placement of 
the shares are organised either by the underwriter or in co-ordination with the exchange, 
depending on the institutional setting (cf. I.3). 
2.  A comparison of listing requirements across European exchanges 
In principle, on every stock exchange, a company has a choice between three regulated market 
segments in which to list its shares: the ‘Main Market’ designed for the listing of large 
companies, the ‘Parallel Market’ that caters to middle and small capitalisations and the ‘New 
Market’ for growth companies. However, a few exchanges make exceptions to this rule. First, 
the Stockholm stock exchange (OMX, Sweden), the Vienna stock exchange (VSE, Austria) and 
the Warsaw stock exchange (WSE, Poland) never opened a New Market, and the Swiss 
exchange (SWX) and Deutsche Börse recently closed their New Markets. Second, the LSE and 
Euronext Amsterdam do not have a specific market segment for the listing of medium and small 
capitalisations since their Main Markets accept all firms, independent of size considerations, 
unless market capitalisation exceeds GBP 700,000 at the LSE and shareholders’ equity is over 
EUR 5 millions on Euronext Amsterdam. At the LSE, the market segmentation between large, 
middle and small capitalisation stocks only applies to the secondary market, which is organised 
in different trading platforms according to liquidity and market recognition criteria. 
The choice between listing market segments is mainly based upon size and, in some cases, may 
also depend on listing costs. Listing requirements are always less stringent on Parallel and New A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 7 
Markets. New markets, introduced in the mid 90s on many exchanges, are usually reserved for 
young, high-growth and technology-oriented companies and generally have very specific 
requirements. Table 4 reports listing requirements for all market segments in our 15 European 
countries. 
2.1. Listing  requirements on Main Markets 
Main markets are characterised by three common requirements, specifically accounting records 
history, capital size and floating capitalisation. 
IPO candidates must always provide audited accounts for the three business years preceding 
the listing date.
6 
Listing on a Main Market is usually conditional on a minimum expected market value except 
in Switzerland,
7 the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, Greece and Turkey where size requirements 
are defined in terms of equity book value. Among Main Markets with market capitalisation 
requirements, the most stringent was, as of February 2005, Euronext Paris (EUR 700 millions), 
followed by Stockholmsbörsen (≅ EUR 33 millions), Borsa Italiana (EUR 20 millions) and 
Euronext Brussels (EUR 15 millions). For other exchanges that require a minimum market 
value, the threshold does not exceed EUR five million, the lowest being GBP 700,000 at the 
LSE. The minimum market size standards have been recently removed on the Belgian, Dutch, 
French and Portuguese Main Markets, since Euronext merged its national regulated markets into 
a single list, called ‘Eurolist’, in 2005. 
Finally, at least 25% of the shares must be offered to the public in all countries except 
Turkey, the Netherlands, and Spain. The minimum requirement at the ISE (Istanbul Stock 
Exchange) does not exceed 15%. BME (Spanish Stock Exchange) defines its floating 
requirement differently since a Spanish firm is authorised to list if at least 100 shareholders own 
less than 25% of the capital. Euronext Amsterdam had the lowest requirement among all 
exchanges with 10% as of April 2005, when Euronext unified its regulated lists and generalised 
the 25% minimum float requirement. 
2.2. Listing  requirements on Parallel Markets 
Parallel or second markets generally have the lowest listing requirements. On many of these 
markets, no minimum market capitalisation is necessary to be listed, and if there is a minimum, 
the value is about EUR one million, the only exception being Euronext Paris with the highest 
requirement in the range of EUR 12-15 million. The minimum percentage of shares to be 
offered to the public generally equals 10% and reaches 20% in a few cases (Greece, Spain and 
Switzerland). In terms of accounting track records, typically, financial statements must be 
provided over a period of two years prior to the IPO, implying a minimum period of existence 
of two years for the issuing firm. 
 
                                                      
6 This common rule results from the convergence of national regulations. 
7 On SWX, the market value requirement was waived on the 1st of January 2001. Before that date, the 
minimum expected market value was equal to CHF 25 million. 8 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
Table 4. Listing requirements on European regulated markets 
Country Exchange Admission 
authority  Main Market  Parallel Market  New Market 
Austria  Vienna 
Stock 
Exchange 
(VSE) 
VSE  Official Market 
General Standard 
Shares with a par value 
Market value > EUR 2.9 millions 
Free float > EUR 725,000 
Non par value shares 
Total number of shares > 20,000 
Market value > EUR 725,000 
Free float > 10,000 shares 
Financial statements for the 3 preceding 
business years 
Prime Standard 
Same as General Standard 
Accounting in accordance with U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS 
Semi-Official Market 
General Standard 
Shares with a par value 
Market value > EUR 725,000 
Free float > EUR 181,250 
Non par value shares 
Total number of shares > 10,000 
Market value > EUR 362,500 
Free float > 2,500 shares 
Financial statements for the 1 preceding 
business years 
Prime Standard 
Same as General Standard 
Accounting in accordance with U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS 
--- 
Belgium 
until April 
2005 
Euronext CBF  Premier Marché 
Market value > EUR 15 millions 
Value of the shares offered to the public 
> EUR 5 millions 
Free float > 25% 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 
years prior to the date of the listing 
Financial reporting in accordance with 
Belgian standards and IFRS 
Second Marché 
Now reserved to listing of real-estate 
investment certificates 
Closed in 2005 
Market value > EUR 1 million 
Filed audited accounts 
Nouveau Marché 
Created in 1997 – Closed in 2005 
High-growth companies 
Capitalisation > EUR 2 millions 
At least 3 years of existence 
Issuance > EUR 5 millions 
Capital increase > 50% of offered shares 
Free float > 25% (10% in some cases) 
Lock-up period for managers: na 
France 
until 
February 
2005 
Euronext  AMF and 
Euronext Paris 
Premier Marché 
Market capitalisation > EUR 700/800 
millions 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 
years prior to the date of the listing 
Number of shares distributed to the 
public > 25% or > 600,000 shares 
Second Marché 
Created in 1983 – closed in 2005 
Market capitalisation > EUR 12/15 
millions 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 2 
years prior to the date of the listing 
Number of shares distributed to the public 
> 10% and > EUR 4.5 millions 
Nouveau Marché 
Created in 1996 – closed in 2005 
High-growth companies 
Shareholders’ equity > EUR 1.5 millions 
Issuance > 100,000 shares and > EUR 5 millions 
Free float > 20% 
Capital increase > 50% of offered shares 
Lock up period: 3 years for 80% of the shares until 1998; from 
1998 to 2003 80% during 1 year or 100% during 6 months; 
since 2003 1 year for 100% of the shares 
Table 4. Cont’d A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 9 
Netherlands 
until April 
2005 
Euronext Euronext 
Amsterdam 
Officiëlle Markt 
Shareholders’ equity > EUR 5 millions 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 10% 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 years prior to the date of the listing 
6-month lock-up period for managers 
Euro.NM Amsterdam 
Created in 1997 in replacement of the Official 
Parallel Market (closed in 1994) – closed in 2005 
High-growth companies 
Shareholders’ equity > EUR 5 millions 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 years 
prior to the date of the listing (1 year only for new 
economy companies) 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 
100,000 and > 20% 
Capital increase > 50% of offered shares 
Lock-up period for managers: 3 years applicable 
to 80% of the shares 
Portugal 
until April 
2005 
Euronext CMVM  Main Market 
Market capitalisation > EUR 2.5 millions 
Total number of shares > 500,000 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 25% 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Second Market 
Closed in 2005 
Market capitalisation > EUR 625,000 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 
10% 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 2 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Novo Mercado 
Closed in 2005 
High-growth companies 
Shareholders’ equity > EUR 1.5 millions 
Market capitalisation > EUR 2.5 millions 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 
100,000 and > 20% 
Capital increase > 50% of offered shares 
Lock up period 
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Belgium, 
France, 
Netherlands, 
Portugal 
 
Since 2005 
Euronext CMF 
AMF 
CMCM 
Eurolist 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 25% 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 year prior to the date of the listing 
Alternext 
Unregulated market. 
No requirement on size, sector, growth. 
2-year track record at least 
With public offer 
Float > EUR 2.5 millions 
Prospectus to be approved by the AMF 
Without public offer 
No float requirement 
Offering circular with no authority approval 
Finland  Helsinki 
Stock 
Exchange 
(HSE) 
HSE  Main List 
Capital ressources > EUR 2 millions 
Shareholders’ equity > EUR 4 millions 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 years 
prior to the date of the listing 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 25% 
Voting rights in the general public > 10% 
I List 
No size requirement 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 2 years 
prior to the date of the listing 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 
15% 
NM List 
Market capitalisation > EUR 2 millions 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 1 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 15% 
Voting rights in the general public > 10% 
3-year business plan 
lock-up period for main shareholders if existence 
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Table 4. Cont’d 
Germany  Deutsche 
Börse 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Official Market 
General Standard 
Market value > EUR 1.25 millions 
Free float > 25% 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 years 
prior to the date of the listing 
Financial reporting in accordance with German 
standards 
Prime Standard 
Same as General Standard 
Financial reporting in accordance with U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS 
Regulated Market – General Standard 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 
10,000 
3 years of existence 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 1 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Financial reporting in accordance with German 
standards 
Neuer Markt 
Created in 1997 – closed in 2003 
Shareholders’ equity > EUR 1.5 millions 
At least 2 designated sponsors 
Issuance > 100,000 shares 
Issuance > EUR 250,000 in nominal value 
Expected market value > EUR 5 millions 
Free float > 20% 
Capital increase against cash > 50% of offered 
shares 
6-month lock-up period for pre-IPO shareholders 
Financial reporting in accordance with U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS 
Greece  Athens Stock 
Exchange 
(ASE) 
ASE 
Capital Market 
Commission 
(CMC) for 
firms not 
complying age 
requirements 
Main Market 
Shareholders’ equity > GRD 4 billions (EUR 
11.74 millions) 
25% of the equity should be distributed to at least 
2,000 shareholders owning less than 2% of the 
capital 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 years 
prior to the date of the listing 
Parallel Market 
Shareholders’ equity > GRD 1 billion (EUR 
2.93 millions) 
20% of the equity should be distributed to at 
least 1,000 shareholders 
Capital increase > 80% of offered shares 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 2 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
New Market (NEHA) 
Created in 1999 
New-technology firms 
Shareholders’ equity > GRD 200 millions (EUR 
587,000) 
Issuance > 100,000 shares 
Issuance > GRD 250 millions (EUR 734,000) 
At least 150 shareholders must own less than 2% 
of the capital. 
Capital increase > 80% of offered shares 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 2 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Lock-up period for shareholders owning >5%: 
80% of the shares during 1 year and 50% during 2 
years 
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Table 4. Cont’d 
Italy  Borsa Italiana CONSOB and 
Borsa Italiana 
Borsa (MTA) 
Blue Chips 
Market capitalisation > EUR 800 millions 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 25% 
3 years of accounting records 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 1 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Ordinary 
Market capitalisation > EUR 20 millions and < 
EUR 800 millions 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 25% 
3 years of accounting records 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 1 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Star 
Market capitalisation > EUR 20 millions and < 
EUR 800 millions 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 35% 
for newly listed companies (>20% for transferred 
companies) 
3 years of accounting records 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 1 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Mercato Expandi 
Market capitalisation > EUR 1 million 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 
10% 
2 years of accounting records 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 1 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Turnover > EUR 750,000 
Last net earnings > EUR 100,000 
Financial debt / consolidated gross operating 
margin > 4 
Nuovo Mercato 
High-growth companies 
Market capitalisation > EUR 3 millions 
Issuance > 100,000 shares 
Issuance > EUR 5 millions 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 1 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 30% 
Capital increase > 50% of offered shares 
Lock-up period for pre-IPO shareholders and 
managers: 1 year applicable to 80% of the shares 
(2 years for start-up companies) 
Poland  Warsaw 
Stock 
Exchange 
(WSE) 
WSE  Main market 
Total book value > PLN 65 millions 
Market capitalisation > PLN 40 millions 
Free float > PLN 32 millions 
Free float > 25% or > 500,000 shares of value > 
PLN 70 millions 
Parallel Market 
Total book value > PLN 22 millions 
Market capitalisation > PLN 14 millions 
Free float > PLN 11 millions 
Free float > 10% or > 200,000 shares of value > 
PLN 35 millions 
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Number of shareholders > 500 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Number of shareholders > 300 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 2 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Spain  BME CNMV  Primer Mercado 
Shareholders’ equity > EUR 1.5 millions 
excluding stakes > 25% belonging to 2 
shareholders 
At least 100 shareholders must own a stake < 25% 
of the capital 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 year 
prior to the date of the listing 
Distributed dividend > 6% of the capital 
Segundo Mercado 
Shareholders’ equity > EUR 250,000 
Public float > 20% 
Nuevo Mercado 
Operational since 2000 
 
Information not available 
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Table 4. Cont’d 
Sweden  Stockholms-
börsen 
(OMX) 
OMX  A – List 
Market capitalisation > SEK 300 millions 
3 years of verifiable history and accounting 
records 
Documented profitability 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 25% 
Voting rights in the general public > 10% 
At least 2,000 shareholders 
Lowest share price on the first listing day: SEK 
25 
O – List 
No history requirement 
No requirement on market value 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 
10% 
Voting rights in the general public > 10% 
At least 300 shareholders 
Lowest share price on the first listing day: SEK 
25 
--- 
Switzerland  Swiss 
Exchange 
(SWX) 
SWX  Main Market 
Capital resources > CHF 25 millions 
No requirement on market capitalisation since 
2001 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 years 
prior to the date of the listing (possible 
exceptions) 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 25% 
and > CHF 25 millions 
Local Caps 
Capital resources > CHF 2.5 millions 
No requirement on market value 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 2 years 
prior to the date of the listing 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 
20% and > CHF 5 millions 
New Market 
Created in 1999 – closed in 2004 
High-growth companies 
Shareholders’ equity > CHF 2.5 millions 
Market capitalisation > CHF 8 millions 
Operating and financial track record over a period 
of 1 year prior to the date of the listing 
Accounts in accordance with U.S. GAAP and 
IFRS 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 20% 
Capital increase > 50% of offered shares 
6-month lock-up period 
Turkey  Istanbul 
Stock 
Exchange 
(ISE) 
ISE  National Market / Second National Market / New Economy Market 
Paid-in or issued capital > TRL 1.25 billions 
Free float > 15% if capital<TRL 750 billions, > 10% if capital within range of TRL 750-1,500 billions, > 5% if capital > TRL 1.5 trillions 
At least 3 calendar years of existence (2 years if free float > 25%) 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 1 year prior to the date of the listing 
Positive earned profits before tax in the last 2 years (previous year only if free float > 25%) A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 15 
United 
Kingdom 
LSE FSA  (UKLA) 
LSE 
Main market 
Market value > GBP 700,000 
Number of shares distributed to the public > 25% 
Filed audited accounts over a period of 3 years ending no later than 6 months prior to the date of the 
listing 
Financial reporting in accordance with UK GAAP, U.S. GAAP and IFRS 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
Created in 1995. 
Unregulated market. 
No requirement on size, floating capitalisation, 
age, sector, growth. 
Admission is only subject to the approval of the 
Nominated Adviser in charge of the IPO. 
Information provided in this table was gathered from regulators and exchanges’ documentations and websites as well as from Schuster (2003) and Giudici and Roosenboom (2005). Lock-up periods are 
minimal requirements set by regulators, but interestingly, original shareholders often agree to lock-up periods and share percentages that exceed regulatory standards. See Goergen et al. (2006) for an 
empirical study of the cross-section and the determinants of lockup agreements on the French and German markets. 
 16 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
It is important to point out that the LSE and Euronext Amsterdam never had a Parallel Market, 
and that Euronext abandoned the Belgian, French, and Portuguese second markets in 2005 and 
moved all stocks to the Main Market, known as ‘Eurolist’. 
2.3. Listing  requirements on New Markets 
New markets usually cater to young high-growth companies, which implies that listing is not 
authorised solely on the basis of historical data but can be justified by growth prospects. For that 
reason, listing on a New Market never requires more than one year of accounting records but 
always involves raising funds, with a capital increase representing at least 50% of the shares 
offered to the public. Listing standards on New Markets often focus on disclosure and 
governance (Giudici and Roosenboom, 2002), and generally require periodic audited financial 
statements meeting international accounting standards. Concerning size, the requirements are 
not expressed in terms of market capitalisation but in terms of shareholders’ equity with a 
minimum requested book value of between one and five million euros. At least 20% of the 
shares must be distributed to the public (30% for the Nuovo Mercato in Italy and 15% for the 
NM list in Finland). 
Another important characteristic of New Markets is the greater uncertainty about the future 
performance of their newly listed firms. To protect new shareholders against adverse selection 
games that pre-IPO shareholders may play, lock-up obligations are imposed on all New 
Markets. During lock-up periods, pre-IPO main shareholders and managers are not allowed to 
sell their shares. Lock-up or lock-in periods last from six months to two years depending on the 
exchange and apply to 80% or 100% of the shares held before the offering. 
With the lack of candidate firms in the years 2000, some exchanges did away with their New 
Markets: Deutsche Börse in 2003, the Swiss Exchange in 2004 and Euronext in 2005. 
2.4. Unregulated  growth  markets: AIM and Alternext 
The rules described above apply to all New Markets in Europe except the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) of the LSE. AIM, created in 1994, has not experienced the slump in 
the market since 2000, unlike other New Markets. There were 258 firms introduced on AIM in 
2004. One of the reasons for the substantial number of IPOs even in recent years is that AIM 
IPOs have not been limited to firms from the ‘new economy’. AIM caters to all firms with 
sound business prospects but that do not meet the listing criteria, mainly in terms of size, of 
Main or Parallel Markets, or of well-established growth markets like NASDAQ. As a result, 36 
industrial sectors are represented on AIM, and of the 950 listed companies, 105 are not UK 
domestic firms. Another explanation for the success of AIM is that, unlike the New Markets of 
continental Europe, which often suffer from the narrowness of the buy side, it benefits from a 
sustained demand coming from an active community of investors specialised in AIM firms. 
But the main characteristic of AIM is that it is not regulated by a market authority. Being 
beyond FSA (Financial Services Authority) supervision, it is only governed by the LSE. With 
regard to European regulations, AIM is exempt from the Prospectus Directive and is considered 
as a Multi-Trading Facility (MTF). Listing on AIM does not require any industrial characteristic 
or any minimum equity size, floating capitalisation or age. Raising funds when going public is 
not compulsory. Lock-up periods are not imposed by the exchange. The admission authority is 
delegated to a special category of underwriters, called ‘nominated advisors’ and commonly 
known as ‘Nomads’, designated and controlled by the LSE according to stringent criteria. 
Nomads co-ordinate due diligence, produce and approve admission documents and implement 
floatation. A company is admitted three days after the nomad confirms to the exchange that the 
firm is suitable for listing on AIM. A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 17 
Given the success of AIM and the decline of continental New Markets, Euronext closed its new 
economy market segments (Euro.NM on Euronext Amsterdam, Nouveau Marché on Euronext 
Paris, Novo Mercado on Euronext Lisbon, Nouveau Marché on Euronext Brussels) in 2005 and 
replaced them with a single organised but unregulated – in the sense of the Prospectus Directive 
– market segment tailored for small companies. In a similar way to AIM, Alternext is not 
regulated by AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers) but does come under the authority of the 
exchange. Listing and trading rules are defined by Euronext. The floatation process is simplified 
and any company, regardless of its industrial sector or country of origin, may request a listing 
provided it has a two-year track record of existence. Floatation can be achieved with or without 
a public offer and is managed by a specialised intermediary, the ‘listing sponsor’, whose role is 
comparable to that of a nominated advisor on AIM. In the case of a private placement without 
public offer, no minimum market size or float is required and information about the IPO is 
disclosed in an offering circular that does not need authority approval. If a public offering is 
launched, Euronext requires a minimum floating capitalisation of 2.5 million euros and a 
prospectus must be approved by the AMF. Post-IPO disclosure obligations are simplified: IFRS 
(International Financial Reporting Standards) financial reports, quarterly accounts and review of 
half-year accounts are not compulsory. Financial communication obligations are restricted to 
semi-annual accounts, audited annual accounts and crossing of shareholding thresholds (50% 
and 95% of the capital). 
2.5.  Other unregulated lists 
Approximately half of the exchanges included in our survey have developed an OTC (over the 
counter) or unregulated market segment in parallel to regulated segments to allow firms that do 
not fulfil the regulated market criteria to obtain a first listing in preparation for a future 
admission on the regulated market. Table 5 lists these unregulated segments without any details 
about their requirements or level of activity as the present study focuses on regulated markets. 
We have deliberately left AIM out of this list as its level of activity and general workings are 
more comparable to those of regulated growth markets than to those of OTC markets. 
Table 5. Unregulated lists 
Country Exchange  Unregulated  market  segment 
Austria VSE  Third  Market 
Belgium  Euronext Brussels  Public Auctions Market 
Finland HSE 
Pre-list 
Brokers’ List Market 
France  Euronext Paris  Marché Libre 
Poland WSE  Free  Market 
Portugal Euronext  Lisbon  Mercado Sem Cotações 
Sweden OMX  OTC-list 
Exchanges not mentioned in the table, except the LSE, have no unregulated list. 
3.  A review of IPO mechanisms on European stock markets and listing 
companies’ practices 
Initial pricing and allocation mechanisms can be divided into three categories: fixed-price 
offerings, auctions and book-building procedures. By definition, book-building procedures are 
handled solely by investment banks. Auction and fixed-price mechanisms can either be 
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primary trading mechanisms to investment banks, Euronext Paris and the ISE offer initial public 
offering mechanisms. 
3.1. Fixed-price  offerings 
In a fixed-price offering, shares are offered to all categories of investors, private and 
institutional, at a single and unchangeable price set in advance by the underwriter and filed in 
the introduction prospectus. Investors submit their applications for shares at the fixed price and 
rationing rules (possibly random but most often pro rata) are used to allocate shares. Fixed-
price offerings exist in all countries except Austria, Greece, Finland and Spain. Specific 
terminology is used in the UK, where any IPO for which shares are offered to the public, either 
through a fixed-price offer or through an auction, is called an ‘offer for subscription’ if new 
funds are raised and ‘offer for sale’ if not. In the case of a fixed-price offering, the offer for sale 
or offer for subscription will be said “at fixed price”. 
3.2. Auctions 
Auctions or tender offerings are IPO mechanisms in which the issuer sets the minimum price at 
which it is willing to sell its shares. All investors, either individual or institutional, are then 
invited to place subscription orders in the form of limit orders at prices above or equal to the 
minimum price. The auctioneer then sets the issue price as a function of the aggregate demand. 
Besides these basic features, different types of auctions exist across Europe. Some auctions 
allow market orders, others do not. In the so-called Dutch auctions, the issue price is set in order 
to perfectly equate supply and demand and clear the market. Orders are served in descending 
order of price limits until clearing the number of offered shares. The lowest price that clears the 
market is the equilibrium price. The auction is said to be discriminatory or multiunit if served 
orders are executed at the limit price they specify. In contrast, in a uniform-price auction, all 
compatible orders are executed at a unique price equal to the equilibrium price. In practice, most 
tender offerings use the uniform-price mechanism, with the exception of the ISE which runs 
discriminatory auctions. Besides, pure Dutch auctions are seldom. Initial offering auctions are 
generally ‘up-bounded’: a maximum price is set and orders at prices above that limit are not 
allowed, or the auctioneer has the discretion to eliminate orders with price limits that far exceed 
the minimum price. In this type of auctions, pro rata rationing can be used. In most countries, 
the auctioneer is the lead manager. On Euronext Paris and at the ISE, the auction mechanisms 
are provided by the exchange. 
The use of auctions for selling IPOs has tended to decline in Europe. Auctions have disappeared 
in Germany and Switzerland. The few countries where auction IPO mechanisms still exist are 
France, the Netherlands, the UK, Poland and Portugal. 
3.3. Book-building 
Book-building, also called ‘placing’ in the UK, and placement in France, exists in all countries 
and has been used increasingly over the 1990s. In the book-building procedure, shares are 
exclusively offered to institutions but not to individual investors. The underwriter sets a price 
range for the shares to be placed. During the subscription period, usually one week, institutional 
investors are invited to place purchase commitments in an order book at prices inside the price 
range. 
The subscription period is preceded by a road-show that can last two weeks. In preparation for 
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estimate an appropriate price for the company’s shares. On the basis of these reports,
8 the 
syndicate members approach institutional investors, present the issuer and gauge the market 
acceptance of the new issue. Depending on the country, the book-building spread can be filed 
either prior to or at the end of the road-show. After the file price range is set, it can be revised if 
there is unusually weak or strong demand. In countries like Germany, the price range is filed 
after the road-show so that feedback from institutional investors provides an indication on how 
the book-building spread should be set. 
At the end of the subscription period, the issue price is determined by monitoring the 
subscription orders received in the order book and, in case of over-subscription, the underwriter 
has complete discretion to allocate the shares. 
In Belgium, Finland, France, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, some 
new issues are offered as a double stage issue whereby, in addition to the private book-building 
process, a separate mechanism offers shares to the public. The simplest and most common 
technique is to offer shares to the public at a fixed price which is equal to the equilibrium price 
set during the book-building process. An alternative method is to organise an auction in which 
individual investors can place limit orders. In this case, the issue price may differ for each 
category of subscribers. To the best of our knowledge, the only exchange that regulates this 
price differential is Euronext Paris, which requires that the issue price paid by institutions in the 
book-building process should not be lower than the definitive public offer price. 
Whereas the majority of institutional placements are associated with public offers in Belgium, 
France, Portugal and Spain,
9 the practice is occasional in the UK and rare in other countries. 
Table 6 gives an overview of the IPO mechanisms that are used in each country of our sample. 
3.4.  Procedures for initial trading on Euronext Paris 
More than any other country in Europe, the French IPO market has been characterised by 
multiple mechanisms being used to carry out IPOs, and the specificity of Euronext Paris’s 
primary market is to offer and handle a range of initial offering mechanisms comprising a fixed-
price offering procedure as well as various auction mechanisms. 
3.4.1. Fixed-price offer 
A firm price and the number of shares to be offered at that price are indicated in the admission 
notice. Investors must place orders at a limit price equal to the proposed firm price but are 
allowed neither market orders nor orders with higher price limits. Bid and offer are then 
matched solely by reducing the quantity of shares allocated per order on a strictly linear basis. 
An identical reduction rate is usually applied to all orders. However, different allocation 
percentages are sometimes set for different categories of orders to favour small orders, or orders 
from individual investors, or a special group of investors. 
                                                      
8 In the United States, during road-shows and book-building, there is a ‘black-out period’ during which no 
more research reports may be published. In Europe, the black-out or quiet period does not exist. 
9 In Spain, since 1992, 100% of IPOs have been introduced through a hybrid book-building mechanism in 
which book-building is used to set the price and allocate shares to institutional investors. A public offer 
tranche is reserved for local retail investors who do not participate in the price-setting process. The 
distribution of the IPO between retail and institutional investors is stated in the preliminary prospectus. 
Allocation to institutional investors is discretionary; allocation to retail investors is pro rata as a function 
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3.4.2. Auction mechanisms 
Direct admission 
The number of shares to be offered, the minimum price asked by the sellers, the maximum 
variation accepted from this minimum (10% in general) and the maximum level of order 
reduction are pre-determined and specified in the notice of admission. Concerning the last point, 
the allocation proportion cannot be less than 4%. 
Investors can place both market and limit orders. Supply and demand are matched through price 
adjustment within the pre-defined price range. If the equilibrium price is located outside this 
range, the match is achieved either by scaling back orders at the maximum price or by 
modifying the price range when the fill rate is less than 4%. 
Minimum price offer 
The admission note defines the number of shares to be made available to the public and the 
minimum price required by the sellers. Only limit orders are accepted and Euronext Paris 
reserves the right to reject orders with limits substantially higher than the minimum. Based on 
its analysis of orders by limit and of accumulated quantities by limit, Euronext Paris determines 
the median range of price limits, eliminates orders with limits out of this price range, sets a 
single offer price inside the range (the lowest limit that allows the offer to be filled) and serves 
all remaining orders with limits equal or superior to the offer price in an identical proportion 
that should exceed 4%. 
Open-price offer 
The introduction notice stipulates a price range. Investors must submit orders at a limit within 
this range, upper and lower bounds included. Orders without price limit or with price limits 
outside the range are rejected. Bid and offer are matched by price adjustments within the pre-
defined range. The offer price is set at the lowest limit price inside the range that fills the 
number of offered shares. Orders at a limit equal or superior to this price are served. If 
necessary, a uniform reduction rate is applied to all orders. As for fixed-price offers, different 
allocation proportions may be applied to different groups of investors. 
Direct admission and minimum price offer procedures cannot be used when the IPO involves a 
placement. Only fixed-price and open-price offerings can be associated with a placement. 
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Table 6. IPO mechanisms by country 
Country Exchange  Book-building 
institutional only 
Book-building 
with public offer  Fixed-price offering  Auction 
Austria  VSE yes  no  no  no 
Belgium  Euronext Brussels  yes  yes  no  no 
Finland  HSE yes  yes  no  no 
France  Euronext Paris  yes (placement)  yes  yes  Various types organised by the 
exchange (direct admission, minimum 
price offer, open price offer) 
Germany  Deutsche Börse  yes  no  yes  not any more 
Greece  ASE yes  no  no  no 
Italy  Borsa Italiana  yes (with fixed price* 
and with open price**) 
no yes  no 
Netherlands  Euronext Amsterdam  yes  no  yes  yes 
Poland  WSE yes  yes  yes  yes 
Portugal  Euronext Lisbon  yes  yes  yes (offer for sale) yes  (offer for sale) 
Spain  BME no  yes***  no  no 
Sweden  OMX yes  yes  yes  no 
Switzerland  SWX  yes  yes  yes  not any more 
Turkey  ISE  yes  no  yes  yes (sale on the ISE) 
United 
Kingdom 
LSE yes  (placing) yes  yes 
(offer for sale at fixed price, 
offer for subscription at fixed 
price) 
yes 
(offer for sale by tender offer, offer for 
subscription by tender offer, open offer) 
* Before 1999, in the Italian book-building procedures, a fixed price was offered to institutions at the end of the marketing period prior to actual order submission. In 1999, this practice was 
abandoned in favour of the book-building with open price. 
** Since 1999, book-building with open price has been the general practice in Italy. The final price is determined after collecting orders from institutions, so that they do not know at which 
price they will effectively buy the shares. 
*** Since 1992, when Royal Decree 291/1992 was published. 22 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
3.5. Relative  advantages of IPO mechanisms 
Table 7 lists, for each mechanism, its main characteristics in terms of pricing and allocation 
rules. 
Table 7. Pricing and allocation rules by IPO mechanism 
 Book-building  Fixed-price offer  Auction 
Offering price  Price range  Fixed price  Minimum price 
or price range 
Order types  Limit orders  Market orders  Limit orders 
Market orders in some cases
Organiser  Lead manager  Lead manager 
or the exchange 
Lead manager 
or the exchange 
Actual issue price  At the discretion of the 
lead manager 
Offering price  Lowest limit filling the offer
Orders filled  Discretionary All  At equilibrium price or 
higher 
Allocation  Discretionary Proportional  Price priority and/or 
Proportional 
 
The two main advantages of fixed-price offerings are low costs and simplicity. Of a sample 
of 2,143 IPOs from 65 countries between 1992 and 1999, Ljungqvist et al. (2003) find them to 
be half as expensive as book-built offers. Fixed-price offerings are also easier to implement than 
other procedures. They allow investors to know, with certainty, before submitting orders, the 
actual price that they will have to pay in case they receive an allocation. Allocation is non 
discretionary and cannot favour particular investors. 
The main drawback of fixed-price issues is the non-elasticity of the price. The offer price is set 
before any precise information about the actual share demand is known and it may differ 
substantially from its optimal value. Loughran et al (1994) show that this pricing mechanism 
tends to result in greater underpricing,
10 that is more money left on the table by issuers. 
According to Welch (1992), in fixed-price offers, issuers have no choice other than underpricing 
offered shares to guarantee their subscription by investors. Using a sample of 182 Italian IPOs 
undertaken in the years 1985-2001, Cassia et al  (2004) find that fixed-price offerings are 
effectively more underpriced than book-built offers. 
As a result, many authors, along with investment banks, defend book-building as an 
optimal floatation mechanism where the road-show and the pre-marketing period serve as an 
information-extraction process for the underwriter,  as modelled by Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989). As underlined by Derrien (2005), the flexibility offered by book-building in terms of 
allocation, allows the lead manager to elicit private information from potential institutional 
investors on their estimate of the share value, as a counterpart to allocation guarantees, so that 
the issue price incorporates, at least partially, this information. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) 
develop a theoretical model that shows that, in the context of asymmetric information, listing 
firms maximise the proceeds of their IPOs when the lead manager is free to determine the IPO 
price and the allocation rules. Similarly, a theoretical model by Benveniste and Busaba (1997) 
demonstrates that the book-building process allows issuers to raise more funds than other 
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methods. Moreover, although there is uncertainty about the final issue price at the start of a 
book-building procedure, the risk at the final price is small, as definitive price changes away 
from the preliminary range seldom occur (Jenkinson and Jones, 2004; Ljungqvist et al., 2003). 
For these reasons and because the underwriters’ firm commitment generally characterises book-
building procedures, book-building is defended by its supporters as a process that minimises the 
risk of IPO failure. 
Another pro book-building argument put forward by underwriters is that they use discretion to 
allocate a defined number of shares to institutions that are likely to be buy-and-hold investors 
(Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001; Jenkinson and Jones, 2004). This type of allocation improves 
post-IPO liquidity and market-making on the secondary market (Boehmer and Fishe, 2004; 
Aggarwal, 2000; Zhang, 2004). According to Chemmanur and Liu (2003), this also helps young 
and growth firms to optimise their price quotation in the long run. Chemannur and Liu (2003) 
and Loughran and Ritter (2002) present the book-building procedure as a way of developing the 
reputation of young and growth companies. The media and analysts tend to follow them closely 
at the time of their introduction when book-building is used, which is not the case for fixed-
price offerings. At a minimum, the role of the bank, in a book-building procedure, facilitates the 
valuation of young and risky candidates. In fact, the bank offers these firms a standby contract 
at the time of their IPOs by adjusting the offer to the demand and reducing uncertainty on equity 
valuation (see Benveniste and Spindt, 1989, Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990). Kutsuma and 
Smith (2004) use a sample of 484 IPOs on JASDAQ over 1995-1999 to investigate issuing 
firms’ motivations for choosing book-building more frequently, since its introduction in 1997, 
even though it is more costly than auctions. They state that companies going public through 
book-building are younger and smaller than those opting for an auction process and conclude 
that book-building allows riskier firms to go public even if the total cost is higher. They 
estimate that between 102 and 145 firms could not have achieved floatation before the 
introduction of book-building. 
Finally, through a book-building procedure, the issuer may choose a given type of shareholding 
structure by advising the underwriter to favour either small orders or large shareholders 
(Brennan and Franks, 1997; Stoughton and Zechner, 1998). 
However, the discretionary allocation power of underwriters is a matter of controversy as 
investment banks are given the liberty to favour some clients according to criteria other than 
best bid. Several cases of abusive allocations in book-built IPOs recently have made headlines 
in the financial press. As mentioned in Degeorge et al (2005), unlawful underwriters’ practices 
include ‘spinning’, which means giving underpriced IPO shares to executives of prospective 
investment banking clients in the hope of winning future underwriting business from them, and 
‘laddering’, that is the practice of giving generous IPO allocations to clients who commit to buy 
more shares in the after-market (Hao, 2004). Another practice mentioned by Loughran and 
Ritter (2002, 2004) is that underwriters allocate hot IPOs to investors in return for commission 
business and they receive greater profits from commission business when there is greater 
underpricing. Boehmer and Fishe (2004), with a sample of 265 U.S. book-built IPOs, show that 
underwriters do not necessarily disadvantage small investors but favour regular IPO investors. 
Several quid pro quo practices of the sort are denounced by other authors. Degeorge et al. 
(2005) provide empirical evidence about the hypothesis that underwriters favour, in the 
allocation process, banks that will provide positive analysts’ coverage of their recent IPOs. 
Another criticism is that book-building excludes, in most cases, individual investors, who are 
left only with the possibility of buying newly listed shares in the secondary market at inflated 
prices. Some book-built IPOs make an exception to that rule and offer shares to the public 
through a double-stage procedure where a fixed- or open-price offering is launched with an 
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then depends on the underwriter’s and the issuer’s motivations that could be increased post-IPO 
liquidity (Boehmer and Fishe, 2000) or maintained control (Brennan and Franks, 1997; Cornelli 
and Goldreich, 2001). In practice, allocating IPOs to only large shareholders, such as pension 
funds, insurance companies etc., may lower post-IPO liquidity. 
As a result, auctions, and in particular the Dutch auction technique, are often claimed, as 
in Bartlett and Shulman (2003), to be the most efficient mechanisms because they provide 
both price adjustment and non-arbitrary allocation. Many academics support auctions as an 
optimal mechanism that results in fair prices and fair allocations. Biais et al (2002) analyse the 
optimal IPO mechanism in a model where there is both asymmetric information and an agency 
problem between issuers and underwriters. They conclude that the discretion that underwriters 
have with book-building results in sub-optimal outcomes for issuers relative to using auction 
mechanisms. 
Derrien and Womack (2003) find that auctioned IPOs exhibit lower initial returns than their 
book-built counterparts because auctions incorporate more information about market conditions 
into the issue price. They interpret this result as proof of the higher price efficiency of auctions. 
Other empirical works that demonstrate that auctions are less costly than book-building in terms 
of direct costs, i.e. placement fees, as well as indirect costs with regard to initial returns, include 
Kaneko and Pettway (2003), Kutsuma and Smith (2004), Degeorge et al. (2005). Pettway and 
Kaneko (1996) and Chemmanur and Liu (2003) show that the auction procedure would be 
optimal for well-established and well-known companies whose objective is to maximise 
proceeds. 
Nevertheless, a downside of the auction mechanism is that it may lead to overpricing in bullish 
markets, with negative effects on welfare. To avoid overpricing, some auction mechanisms 
stipulate a maximum price for the offer, which also limits the uncertainty about the final price 
for subscribers. Further, auctions are usually associated with ‘best effort’
11 contracts and not 
firm commitments, as opposed to book-built offerings. Lastly, for reasons discussed above, 
auctions are probably unable to promote the initial listing of small, young, unknown companies. 
3.6. Listing  companies’ practices 
A sample of 2,104 European IPOs, described in Appendix 1, was obtained for the period 1995-
2004. This sample represents 40.38% of the total number of IPOs reported by the WFE during 
the same period (see Table 1). A breakdown of these new listings per country and per year is 
found in Table B of Appendix 1. These data confirm the cold and hot issue periods already 
identified from the WFE statistics. 
For each IPO of the sample, we collected the issue date, price and initial offering mechanism. 
The data on the IPO allocation mechanism was provided by the national exchanges except for 
Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. An attempt was made to 
fill this gap in the database by surveying the 400 companies which listed on these exchanges 
and 103 responses were received. Consequently, a complete database of information exists for 
1,807 issuers out of the 2,104 IPOs. Statistics about the breakdown of IPOs by initial allocation 
mechanism are provided in Table 8 for each country. Consistent with the recent literature (Biais 
and Faugeron-Crouzet, 2002; Sherman, 2003; and Ljungqvist et al, 2003), a bias toward the 
book-building procedure and away from the fixed-price and auction mechanisms is clearly 
evident. Auctions have disappeared on most exchanges except Euronext Brussels, Euronext 
Paris and the ISE. Fixed-price offers are used significantly in only 4 countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany and Turkey). Over the whole sample, more than 4 IPOs out of 5 involve book-
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building. In 3 countries, that is Austria, Greece and Spain, book-building is the only initial 
offering procedure used. Finally, when book-building is chosen for the IPO, the offering is 
generally restricted to institutions, except on the Belgian, French, Portuguese and Spanish
12 
primary markets, where book-building procedures are most commonly associated with a public 
offer at a fixed or open price. 
Table 8. IPO mechanisms per country in a sample of 2,104 IPOs from 1995 to 2004 
Fixed-price offerings  Auctions  Book-building  Unclassified 
Country 
in number in %  in number in %  in number in %  in number  in % 
Total 
Austria  0 0.0% 0  0.0%  23  100.0% 0  0.0%  23 
Belgium  4  6.9% 11  19.0% 23  39.7% 20  34.5% 58 
Finland  6 13.6%  0  0.0%  6  13.6% 32  72.7% 44 
France  32 8.8%  71  19.6%  260  71.6% 0  0.0%  363 
Germany  12 2.9% 1  0.2%  402 96.9% 0  0.0%  415 
Greece  0 0.0% 0  0.0%  183  100.0% 0  0.0%  183 
Italy  1 0.7% 0  0.0%  134 99.3% 0  0.0%  135 
Netherlands  3 6.4% 0  0.0% 0  0.0%  44  93.6%  47 
Poland**  0 0.0% 0  0.0% 7  7.4%  88  92.6%  95 
Portugal  4  25.0% 0  0.0%  12 75.0% 0  0.0%  16 
Spain  0 0.0% 0  0.0%  36  100.0% 0  0.0%  36 
Sweden*  9 9.5% 0  0.0% 9  9.5%  77  81.1%  95 
Switzerland  6 9.8% 0  0.0%  19  31.1%  36  59.0%  61 
Turkey  66  83.5% 9 11.4% 4  5.1% 0  0.0%  79 
UK  3 0.7% 0  0.0%  451 99.3% 0  0.0%  454 
Total  146 6.9%  92  4.4%  1,569  74.6%  297  14.1%  2,104 
* Most unclassified IPOs in Sweden should be considered as book-built according to Swedish specialists. 
** Although the classification is lacking for most Polish issues, auctions are said to be widely used in Poland. 
4.  The cost of going public 
Apart from up-front costs, the direct cost of a new listing corresponds to the underwriter’s 
compensation, the so-called gross spread, generally expressed as a percentage of the IPO 
proceeds. As claimed by Bartlett and Shulman (2003), this cost can be prohibitive and deter 
some firms from going public, in particular in the United States, where spreads are greater than 
in Europe according to international comparative studies (Chen and Ritter, 2000; Tortsila, 2001, 
2003; Ljungqvist et al., 2003). Medium-sized issuing firms in the US generally support a spread 
of 7%, while the spreads are of 4%, 3%, and 2.5% respectively in Germany, France and 
Belgium, as reported by Torstila (2003).
13 Moreover, Ljungqvist et al. (2003) find that the fees 
increase when the underwriter is American or when there is a U.S. tranche. 
Whether the high level of underwriting fees is caused by a lack of competition between 
investment banks is a matter of debate. Chen and Ritter (2000) report that, since 1994, gross 
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spreads have been equal to 7% for almost all medium-sized IPOs, regardless of the proceeds and 
risk of the offering. The clustering of gross spreads could result from collusive behaviour by 
underwriters and thus explain their relatively high level. In Europe, where gross spreads are 
lower, Torstila (2003) find them to be less clustered. 
However, clustering and collusion may not be the only factors. Torstila (2003) proves that gross 
spread clustering is inversely related to spread level and that gross spreads in Germany, France 
and Belgium, are clustered as much as in the United States despite their lower level. Other 
authors, in particular Degeorge et al. (2005) assign the high level of spreads to the intensive use 
of book-building, for which investment banks charge higher fees. 27 | 
II. A comparison of IPO underpricing and long-run performance 
across European markets 
Despite the large body of literature on IPOs, two enigmas remain as yet unresolved. First, there 
is evidence of high initial returns to equity IPOs in the United States, in Europe and in Asia. 
Second, patterns of long-term underperformance have been observed following IPOs. 
Underpricing has been considered a market anomaly to the principle of efficiency, because the 
size of underpricing is much higher than the premium offered for equivalent stocks in terms of 
risk. However, recent theories that consider IPO underpricing as an informational event or a tool 
for risk management, have attempted to reconcile the IPO underpricing puzzle with market 
efficiency. 
This part of our work is devoted to providing an overview of IPO performance in Europe. The 
first subsection documents initial returns while long-run performance is addressed in the second 
sub-section. 
1.  A comparison of IPO initial underpricing across European markets 
The initial return of an IPO corresponds to the difference between the equilibrium price 
following the issue and the IPO price. The post-IPO equilibrium price is the first trade price 
following the IPO, or the first closing price, or a closing price observed a few days after the IPO 
date. The IPO price, by definition, is the price at which the new shareholders buy the shares at 
issue. It is jointly determined by the listing firm and its underwriter at the end of the IPO 
procedure according to financial analysts’ valuations and the demand expressed for the shares. 
The definitive offer price is generally lower than the first equilibrium price, which is well-
known under the term of IPO underpricing. 
1.1.  Measures of IPO underpricing 
Measures of underpricing differ according to which price is taken as the post-IPO equilibrium 
price and which return is chosen as a benchmark. 
1.1.1. Raw initial returns 
Initial performance can be measured by the difference between the post-listing equilibrium price 
(EP) and the final offering price (OP) divided by the offering price: 
1
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A main problem is the choice of the equilibrium price EP, i.e. the trading price matching the 
offer and the demand for the shares after the IPO. When the market is sufficiently liquid, EP 
generally corresponds to the first-day closing price. In other cases, the equilibrium may be 
obtained a couple of days after the IPO. For that reasons, some authors measure initial returns 
over a five day or one week horizon (Table 9). 
The raw initial return U can be considered a measure of underpricing, assuming that the normal 
return under efficiency would be 0 and that the equity risk is equivalent to the market risk. Other 
methods relax these assumptions and adjust raw returns. 
1.1.2. Adjusted initial returns 
Three adjustment methods are used in the literature: 
-  the initial return adjusted for a market index return, 28 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
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where I1 designates the market index closing price on the first trading day and I0, the index 
closing value the day before, 
-  the initial return adjusted for systematic risk, 
I
I I
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= β   (II.3),
where β is the systematic risk, 
-  and the raw initial return adjusted for the return of a control portfolio (Ritter (1991) and 
Affleck-Graves et al. (1993)), 
p p R
OP
OP EP
U −
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where Rp is the return of a reference portfolio. 
Moreover, some papers (Keloharju, 1993; Husson and Jacquillat, 1990) calculate the return that 
would be obtained by an uninformed investor participating in all the IPOs. 
Considering that the market movements are too small to affect the initial returns significantly, 
most studies measure IPO underpricing with raw returns and select the closing price at the end 
of the first day of quotation as the equilibrium price. Adjusted returns are preferred when the 
delay between the IPO date and the determination of the first equilibrium price is too long 
(Périer, 1996). 
The most widely utilised adjusted measure is  m U , which implicitly standardises systematic risk 
to 1. As pointed out by Kooli (2000), the limits of the second model ( s U ) lie in the difficult and 
biased estimation of beta. 
1.2.  Empirical results on IPO underpricing in Europe: previous literature 
A well-accepted result is that IPOs are underpriced. Underpricing has been observed around the 
world in various periods (Ritter and Welch, 2002), even though the level of underpricing has 
changed over time (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). In the 1980s, average IPO underpricing was 
7%. It increased to 15% during the period 1990-1998, before jumping to 65% during the short 
1999-2000 period corresponding to the Internet bubble. Table 1 summarises the main articles 
that report empirical evidence about IPO initial performance in the 15 European markets of our 
sample. Although the magnitude of initial returns depends on the selected measure and is 
probably influenced by taxation and specific national regulation, as in the US, IPO underpricing 
is uniformly observed in Europe and also varies over time. A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 29 
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Table 9. Empirical evidence of IPO underpricing in Europe 
Country Authors  Period  Sample  size  Methodology Horizon  Mean underpricing 
Austria  Aussenegg (2006)  1984-1996  62  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  6.46% 
       1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  5.75% 
Belgium  Deloof et al. (2002)  1993-2000  33  1 OP MP 30 −   1
st month  18.9% 
 Goergen  et al. (2003)  1996-2000  13 (Euro.NM)  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  10.36% 
       1 OP P8 −   1
st week  5.38% 
  Manigart and de Maeseneire (2003)  1996-October 1999  12 (Euro.NM)  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  -0.10% 
Finland  Keloharju (1993)  1984-1989  80  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  8.7% 
  Westerholm (2000)   1994-1997  14  ( ) 1 OP P ln 1 −   1
st day  11.4% 
France  Chahine (2004b)  1996-2000  172  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  22.76% 
  Degeorge and Derrien (2001b)  1991-1998  243  1 OP P 10 −   10
 th day  17.5% 
  Derrien and Womack (2003)  1992-1998  264  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  13.23% 
  Faugeron-Crouzet and Ginglinger (2002)  1983-1994  292  1 OP EP −   equilibrium 18.67% 
 Goergen  et al. (2003)  1996-2000  144 (Euro.NM)  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  4.19% 
       1 OP P8 −   1
st week  25.10% 
  Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002)  1990 - May 2000  516  1 OP P5 −   5
th day  16.5% 
 Schuster  (2003)  1988-1998 323  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  12.37% 
 Sentis  (2001)  1991-1995  61  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  9.24% 
       0 1 1 I I OP P −    9.01% 
Germany  Goergen, et al. (2003)  1996-2000  319 (Euro.NM)  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  43.32% 
       1 OP P8 −   1
st week  54.27% 
 Ljungqvist  (1997)  1970-1993 189  ( ) ( ) 0 1 1 I I ln OP P ln −   1
st day  9.2% 
  Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002)  1990-May 2000  470  1 OP P5 −   5
th day  40.2% 
 Schuster  (2003)  1988-1998 219  1 OP P1 −   1
st day  25.66% 
 Stehle  et al. (2000)  1960-1995  187  1 OP P1 −   1
st day  15.79% 
  Steib and Mohan (1997)  1988-1994  103  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  6.81% 30 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
Table 9. Cont’d 
Country Authors  Period  Sample  size  Methodology Horizon  Mean underpricing 
Greece  Gounopoulos (2003)  1990-2001  225  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  46.13% 
       0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  45.41% 
 Nounis  (2003)  1994-2002  254  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  41.09% 
       0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  42.1% 
Italy  Arosio et al. (2000)   1985- August 2000  164  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  23.94% 
         0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  21.06% 
 Cassia  et al. (2004)   1985-2001  182  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  21.87% 
         0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  19.25% 
  Fabrizio (2000)   1988-1998  77  ( ) ( ) 0 1 1 I I ln OP P ln −   1
st day  11.1% 
 Goergen  et al. (2003)   1996-2000  26 (Euro.NM)  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  18.84% 
       1 OP P8 −   1
st week  36.88% 
 Schuster  (2003)    1988-1998  77  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  13.03% 
Doeswijk et al. (2005)  1977-2001  154  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st  day  14.9%  Netherlands 
van Frederikslust and van der Geest (2001)  1985-1998  106  1 OP P 1 −   1
st  day  16% 
       0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st  day  16% 
 Goergen  et al. (2003)  1996-2000  11  1 OP P 1 −   1
st  day  86.07% 
       1 OP P8 −   1
st  week  64.47% 
  van der Goot (2003)  1983-1997  92  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  15.23% 
  Roosenboom and van der Goot (2005)  1984-2001  118  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  11.03% 
 Roosenboom  et al. (2003)  1984-1994  64  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  3.82% 
 Schuster  (2003)  1988-1998  75  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  13.46% 
Poland  Aussenegg (2000)  1991-1998  98  1 OP P 1 −   1
st  day  27.51% 
       0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st  day  21.78% 
  Jelic and Briston (2003)  1991-1999  92  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st  day  28.83% 
Portugal  Duque and Almeida (2000)  1992-1998  10  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  16.95% A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 31 
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Table 9. Cont’d 
Country Authors  Period  Sample  size  Methodology Horizon  Mean underpricing 
Spain  Alvarez and Gonzalez (2005)  1987-1997  56  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  12.29% 
       0 1 1 I I OP P −    11.77% 
  Ansotegui and Fabregat (1999)  1986-1998  99  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  10.68% 
  Arcas and Ruiz (1999)  1992-1997  44  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  17.17% 
 Schuster  (2003)  1988-1998  88  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  14.75% 
Sweden  Bodnaruk et al. (2004)  July 94-June 2001  124  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  14.2% 
  Rydqvist (1997)  1980-July 1994  251  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  40.7% before 90 – 8% after 90 
 Schuster  (2003)  1988-1998  148  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  18.46% 
Switzerland  Drobetz et al. (2005)  1983-2000  120  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  34.94% 
       0 1 1 I I OP P −    34.97% 
  Kunz and Aggarwal (1994)  1983-1989  42  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  35.8% 
 Schuster  (2003)  1988-1998  43  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  9.71% 
Turkey  Kiymaz (2000)  1990-1996  163  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st day  13.1% 
United 
Kingdom 
Brennan and Franks (1997)  1986-1989  64  0 1 5 I I OP P −   5
th day  9.52% 
 Brown  (1999)  1990-1995  232  1 OP P 1 −   1
st day  8.70% 
 Levis  (1993)  1980-1988  712  0 1 1 I I OP P −   1
st  day  14.53% 
 Levis  (2004)  2000  240  1 OP P 1 −   1
st  day  60.1% 
  Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002)  1990- May 2000  876  1 OP P5 −   5
th day  39.6% 
The post-IPO equilibrium price can be the first trade price following the IPO, or the first closing price, or a closing price observed a few days after the IPO date. OP, P1, P5, 
P8 respectively designate the offering price, the closing price on the first day of trading, the closing price on the 5
th working day following the IPO and the closing price on 
the 8
th post-IPO calendar day. MP30 is the mean closing price over the 30 calendar days following the IPO. EP denotes the first equilibrium price following the IPO. I0 (I1) is 
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1.3.  IPO underpricing in Europe in the recent years (1995-2004) 
We compare the initial returns measured for the European IPO sample presented in Appendix 1 
to those reported for prior periods. Consistent with previous studies, the mean raw return for the 
2,104 European IPOs composing our sample on their first day of trading is very positive and 
equals 22.06%. We calculate raw returns in logarithmic terms according to equation (II.1) with 
4 different post-issue prices: the first closing price following the IPO, the closing price on the 5
th 
trading day following the IPO, the closing price on the 10
th trading day following the IPO and 
the closing price one month after the issue. We also adjust these returns for market index returns 
as in equation (II.2). Daily closing prices and index values are obtained from Thomson 
Financial Datastream. Statistics on these initial returns comprising the mean, the median and the 
standard deviation, are reported in Table 10 for each country and each index. Substantial 
underpricing is found for all countries within a time horizon between one day and one month 
and for any benchmark, with no discrepancy between adjusted and raw returns. As an 
illustration, the average 1
st trading day adjusted return rises to 22.01%, a value that is not 
significantly different from the average raw return of 22.06% mentioned above. These abnormal 
returns do not disappear in the short run and even grow slightly until the end of the first month 
of listing in most cases. When alternative indices are utilised to adjust returns, the results are not 
benchmark-dependent. 
In spite of the convergence of mean values, standard deviations are large, proving that IPO 
initial returns are heterogeneous. Further, the median raw 1
st-day return is far below the mean, at 
6.41%. In fact, the distribution of initial returns is highly skewed, with median returns being 
inferior to mean returns in all cases. 
Although the underpricing phenomenon is observed in every country of the sample, the level of 
underpricing varies notably from one national market to another. Countries where underpricing 
is close to the mean are Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Underpricing is relatively limited in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden 
and Turkey, with the lowest average initial returns in France and Turkey, while initial returns 
exceed the sample mean in Germany where the mean 1
st-day raw return equals 38.93%, in 
Greece with an average 1
st-day return of 46.68% and to a lesser extent in Finland (27.76%). In 
order to understand the national cross-section of initial returns, the sample is broken down 
according to macroeconomic factors such as economic sector (Table 12) and business cycle 
(Table 11) as well as introduction mechanisms (Table 13). 
Our sample is equally balanced between New Markets’ and traditional market segments’ issues. 
As expected, New Markets’ issues exhibit larger initial returns (Table 11 Panel A), the excess 
initial returns of growth markets relative to Main and Parallel Markets being even greater in hot 
primary markets. The number of IPOs per annum reported in Appendix 1 Table B indicate that 
our ten-year observation period is characterised by three successive sub-periods: a low period 
from 1995 to 1997, a hot market in 1998-2000 and an extremely cold market from the end of 
2000. The only exceptions are the London and the Athens stock exchanges where primary 
markets remain rather active in the years 2001-2004. Consistent with the findings of Loughran 
and Ritter (2002, 2004), underpricing varies across these market cycles: it increases 
substantially during the hot market period (Table 11 Panel B) and then falls in the cold market 
to levels observed in the eighties and the early nineties. In addition, the average difference in 
initial returns between traditional and growth segments nearly doubles during the hot issue 
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Table 10. Initial returns of IPOs in Europe by country from 1995 to 2004 
Country  Sample size      Raw initial returns (in %)      Adjusted initial returns (in %) 
       1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 
open days 
1st month 
of trading   Index    1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 
open days 
1st month 
of trading 
All  2104   Mean  22.06 28.09 29.29 31.32   Largest Mean  22.01 27.80 28.73 30.40 
    Median  6.41 9.36 9.65 10.17   Largest Median  6.49 8.87 9.34 9.72 
    Std-dev  46.45 66.22 70.75 77.09   Largest Std-dev  46.47 66.02 70.50 76.41 
Austria  23   Mean  6.96 15.19 11.63 12.23   ATI Mean  7.11 15.59 11.81 11.23 
    Median  2.54 1.36 2.66 3.27   Median  2.65 1.56 3.18 2.38 
    Std-dev  16.38 40.51 31.04 36.34   Std-dev  16.45 40.33 31.23 35.54 
Belgium  58   Mean  12.21 14.32 14.42 17.12   BEL20 Mean  11.98 13.31 12.82 15.13 
    Median  4.73 4.65 7.36 6.28   Median  5.10 2.74 4.37 4.78 
    Std-dev  20.05 28.02 28.07 38.00   Std-dev  19.95 27.23 26.72 36.49 
Finland  44   Mean  27.76 25.89 27.46 26.43   HEX General Mean  27.38 23.93 22.97 20.93 
    Median  1.99 3.59 4.69 0.84   Median  3.65 5.30 0.55 2.64 
    Std-dev  65.54 60.44 66.28 63.99   Std-dev  65.34 59.28 64.49 61.03 
France  363   Mean  5.36 18.23 20.19 23.98   CAC40 Mean  5.23 17.54 19.00 22.15 
    Median  0.00 8.53 8.52 9.26   Median  0.46 7.50 7.46 7.84 
    Std-dev  14.17 31.94 38.66 52.39   Std-dev  14.13 31.65 37.96 51.40 
         SBF 250 Mean  5.25 17.65 19.14 22.28 
        Median  0.36 7.73 8.05 7.49 
        Std-dev  14.12 31.66 37.99 51.40 
Germany  415   Mean  38.93 39.75 41.20 44.42   DAX 200 Mean  38.86 39.39 40.49 42.80 
    Median  12.49 12.00 13.38 13.78   Median  12.44 11.45 13.08 11.34 
    Std-dev  62.35 72.37 76.41 85.83   Std-dev  62.33 72.28 76.23 85.49 
         DAX 30 Mean  38.97 39.61 41.00 43.77 
        Median  11.74 13.18 13.40 13.52 
        Std-dev  62.37 72.15 75.85 84.76 
         FAZ General Mean  38.96 39.64 40.98 43.92 
        Median  12.21 12.84 13.23 13.77 
        Std-dev  62.27 72.03 75.72 84.67 34 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
Table 10. Cont’d 
Country  Sample size      Raw initial returns (in %)      Adjusted initial returns (in %) 
       1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 
open days 
1st month 
of trading   Index    1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 
open days 
1st month 
of trading 
Greece  183   Mean  46.68 69.94 74.21 79.32   Athens SE General Mean  46.52 69.39 73.49 78.59 
     Median  23.91 25.97 28.31 34.66   Median  23.94 27.00 27.84 33.92 
     Std-dev  64.54 125.39 135.70 148.16   Std-dev  64.77 125.30 135.83 147.36 
Italy  135   Mean  10.26 12.97 15.06 15.88   MIB 30 Mean  10.41 12.95 14.85 15.00 
     Median  0.63 0.01 0.00 -0.30   Median  1.31 1.06 1.15 0.40 
     Std-dev  26.13 42.83 48.00 49.24   Std-dev  25.94 42.35 47.93 47.97 
         Milan Comit Global Mean  10.25 12.85 14.92 15.02 
         Median  1.27 0.39 1.14 0.43 
         Std-dev  26.06 42.36 48.03 48.19 
Netherlands 47   Mean  22.92 26.08 23.81 19.87   AEX Mean  22.74 25.85 22.96 17.53 
     Median  7.06 7.12 5.13 2.16   Median  6.79 5.55 1.59 0.92 
     Std-dev  53.96 60.81 49.69 58.94   Std-dev  53.93 60.59 50.08 58.73 
         Mean  22.71 25.67 22.84 17.65 
        
Amsterdam SE All 
Shares Median  7.00 5.44 2.16 1.09 
         Std-dev  53.91 60.50 49.85 58.69 
Poland  95   Mean  19.55 17.68 16.66 16.56   WGI 20 Mean  19.81 18.38 16.50 14.93 
     Median  7.14 6.55 5.71 1.79   Median  7.03 6.28 7.26 1.86 
     Std-dev  53.15 61.05 62.10 64.08   Std-dev  53.86 61.65 63.18 65.33 
         WGI Mean  19.78 18.19 16.48 14.78 
         Median  7.18 6.29 5.64 3.93 
         Std-dev  53.77 61.71 63.20 65.21 
Portugal  16   Mean  21.30 24.22 24.57 27.94   PSI 20 Mean  20.83 23.49 23.06 25.31 
     Median  12.87 14.76 16.84 16.03   Median  11.57 12.49 16.07 17.27 
     Std-dev  26.19 33.29 27.59 31.72   Std-dev  26.20 31.56 25.53 27.31 
Spain  36   Mean  10.73 16.99 16.77 17.13   Madrid SE Index Mean  10.27 16.33 15.57 17.38 
     Median  0.06 9.42 10.65 11.13   Median  2.22 8.80 6.38 14.52 
     Std-dev  23.39 32.78 33.97 38.00   Std-dev  23.49 31.37 32.76 36.70 A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 35 
 
Table 10. Cont’d 
Country  Sample size      Raw initial returns (in %)      Initial adjusted returns (in %) 
       1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 
open days 
1st month 
of trading   Index    1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 
open days 
1st month 
of trading 
Sweden  95   Mean  15.93 15.74 19.20 18.64   OMX 30 Mean  15.81 15.27 19.05 16.91 
     Median  6.25 4.41 7.73 8.70   Median  7.22 4.44 7.73 8.09 
     Std-dev  33.62 36.67 44.05 38.61   Std-dev  33.47 35.94 42.93 37.68 
Switzerland  61   Mean  18.08 18.68 16.21 17.14   SPI Mean  18.04 18.15 15.04 14.73 
     Median  3.33 5.00 5.90 6.55   Median  3.50 5.46 5.50 4.13 
     Std-dev  42.30 34.39 33.49 34.26   Std-dev  42.12 34.32 33.39 34.03 
         Mean  18.16 18.67 16.24 16.08 
        
Vontobel Small 
Companies Median  3.18 5.62 5.21 3.70 
         Std-dev  42.16 34.24 33.09 33.59 
         SMI Mean  18.03 18.05 14.90 14.73 
         Median  3.47 5.37 4.81 4.83 
         Std-dev  42.12 34.35 33.39 34.13 
Turkey  79   Mean  4.62 8.02 7.39 19.00   ISE National 100 Mean  4.72 7.84 5.94 18.55 
     Median  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   Median  -0.67 4.08 3.37 0.92 
     Std-dev  23.21 34.35 36.85 68.61   Std-dev  22.80 33.96 36.00 66.51 
UK  454   Mean  21.27 26.33 26.84 25.94   FTSE All Shares Mean  21.23 26.30 26.96 26.30 
     Median  10.60 12.50 12.50 12.63   Median  10.57 12.55 12.87 12.53 
     Std-dev  39.68 65.60 69.37 66.51   Std-dev  39.70 65.50 69.30 66.29 
         FTSE 100 Mean  21.24 26.29 26.97 26.37 
         Median  10.67 12.50 12.92 12.82 
         Std-dev  39.70 65.52 69.33 66.32 
         FTSE 350 Mean  21.23 26.30 26.95 26.30 
         Median  10.59 12.53 12.88 12.52 
         Std-dev  39.70 65.50 69.31 66.31 
Initial returns are calculated for 4 different time intervals following the IPO: over the first day of trading, the first five trading days, the first ten trading days and the first month of listing. For a 
given interval of t trading days after the initial offer, the raw initial return is computed as the logarithm of the closing price on date t divided by the issue price and the adjusted return equals the raw 
return minus the index return measured as the logarithm of the index closing value on date t divided by the index closing value on the day preceding the IPO. Means and standard-deviations are 
equally weighted. All means are significantly positive at the 1% level. Exceptions are mean underpricing for Austria at the 5-day horizon (significant at 10%), 10-day horizon (significant at the 10% 
level) and 1
-month horizon (not significant), and Turkey at the 1-day horizon (significant at the 10% level) and the 10-day horizon (not significant). 36 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
Table 11. Initial returns of IPOs in Europe by market segment and sub-period from 1995 to 2004 
Panel A: by market segment 
  Raw initial returns (in %)  Initial adjusted returns (in %) 
Segment  Sample 
size    1
st trading day first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading 
1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading 
821 Mean  11.58 14.77 14.99 15.62 11.54 14.57 14.33 14.29  Traditional 
markets    Median  3.06 5.71 5.13 4.37 3.42 5.61 4.75 3.89 
    Std-dev  28.83 36.08 38.80 43.47 28.95 36.02 38.59 42.93 
New markets  947 Mean  28.46 34.14 35.83 37.62 28.42 33.85 35.53 37.05 
    Median  9.09 12.61 12.50 13.95 8.98 13.01 12.90 14.41 
    Std-dev  53.96 69.70 73.77 78.32 53.91 69.41 73.32 77.47 
Panel B: by period 
  Raw initial returns (in %)  Initial adjusted returns (in %) 
Period  Sample 
size    1
st trading day first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading 
1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading 
1995-1997  389 Mean  15.86 17.69 18.77 20.42 15.89 17.48 18.09 18.29 
    Median  8.61 9.08 9.42 8.53 8.33 8.60 8.17 7.35 
    Std-dev  31.03 35.68 38.13 42.56 31.17 36.01 38.55 42.64 
1998-2000  1290 Mean  27.18 36.28 37.89 40.61 27.06 35.78 37.05 39.42 
    Median  6.00 11.47 12.02 13.35 6.23 11.27 11.47 12.67 
    Std-dev  53.98 78.79 84.02 90.76 54.01 78.54 83.71 89.92 
2001-2004  425 Mean  12.19 12.76 12.82 13.11 12.26 13.01 13.19 14.08 
    Median  5.74 5.60 6.33 5.69 5.76 5.65 6.44 7.02 
    Std-dev  27.41 34.29 37.85 45.51 27.37 34.16 37.91 45.46 
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Table 11. Cont’d 
Panel C: by period and segment 
  Raw initial returns (in %)  Initial adjusted returns (in %) 
Period Segment  Sample 
size  1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading 
1
st trading 
day 
first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading 
1995-1997 Traditional  237  Mean  17.40 19.22 19.93 20.47 17.64 19.32 19.65 19.11 
     Median  8.95 9.35 9.98 8.58 9.21 9.22 8.65 7.90 
     Std-dev  34.49 39.42 40.49 42.66 34.67 39.69 40.77 42.99 
 New  64  Mean  16.30 18.68 19.88 25.54 16.13 18.15 18.49 22.09 
     Median  5.93 9.86 9.62 11.53 7.08 8.91 7.97 8.21 
     Std-dev  27.01 28.99 33.95 46.64 26.71 28.62 33.46 46.27 
1998-2000 Traditional  458  Mean  10.42 15.63 15.74 16.82 10.23 15.17 14.68 15.00 
     Median  1.00 6.22 4.18 3.30 1.73 5.35 3.64 2.61 
     Std-dev  28.28 37.71 41.57 47.86 28.37 37.52 41.11 46.98 
 New  651  Mean  34.87 42.26 44.50 46.74 34.79 41.84 43.98 45.77 
     Median  10.00 16.42 17.46 21.20 9.81 16.29 17.38 18.87 
     Std-dev  61.90 80.14 84.30 88.41 61.88 79.83 83.85 87.56 
2001-2004 Traditional  126  Mean  4.86 3.28 2.98 2.13 4.84 3.47 3.03 2.66 
     Median  1.37 1.04 0.84 -0.42 1.80 2.50 2.01 2.03 
     Std-dev  12.92 15.37 16.43 18.70 12.81 14.87 16.52 18.59 
 New  232  Mean  13.81 15.59 15.88 15.34 13.92 15.77 16.51 16.72 
     Median  8.00 9.30 9.78 7.81 8.18 8.54 10.06 9.63 
     Std-dev  23.88 31.61 36.03 41.92 23.80 31.56 35.85 41.61 
Initial returns are calculated for 4 different time intervals following the IPO: over the first day of trading, the first five trading days, the first ten trading days and the first month of listing. 
For a given interval of t trading days after the initial offer, the raw initial return is computed as the logarithm of the closing price on date t divided by the issue price and the adjusted 
return equals the raw return minus the index return measured as the logarithm of the index closing value on date t divided by the index closing value on the day preceding the IPO. Means 
and standard-deviations are equally weighted. Indices are those of Table 10. For countries with several indices, the largest index is chosen. 
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Table 12. Initial returns of IPOs in Europe by economic sector from 1995 to 2004 
  Raw initial returns (in %)  Initial adjusted returns (in %) 
Sector  Sample 
size    1
st trading day  first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading  1
st trading day first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading 
Industry  655 Mean  17.15 20.95 20.02 21.69 16.93 20.74 19.48 20.70 
    Median  4.69 6.45 6.33 6.67 4.72 6.33 6.33 5.49 
    Std-dev  38.90 54.99 55.27 60.92 39.07 55.17 55.65 60.78 
Bank-Insurance  85 Mean  17.20 21.25 22.00 18.31 17.42 20.74 21.13 17.53 
    Median  5.08 7.69 5.93 3.27 5.32 6.44 5.76 3.01 
    Std-dev  46.71 56.78 57.46 55.31 46.74 56.66 57.91 55.97 
NTIC  679 Mean  28.81 37.42 39.82 43.51 28.90 37.13 39.30 42.61 
    Median  8.82 14.29 14.29 16.82 8.51 14.53 14.33 16.84 
    Std-dev  54.27 77.26 83.70 90.83 54.14 76.82 83.26 89.77 
Other services  681 Mean  20.75 26.48 28.58 30.01 20.67 26.11 27.98 29.10 
    Median  6.66 8.16 9.71 9.13 6.83 8.46 9.83 10.07 
    Std-dev  44.00 64.45 70.29 77.04 44.03 64.18 69.73 76.23 
Table 13. Initial returns of IPOs in Europe by floatation mechanism from 1995 to 2004 
  Raw initial returns (in %)  Initial adjusted returns (in %) 
Mechanism  Sample 
size    1
st trading day  first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading  1
st trading day first 5 open 
days 
first 10 open 
days 
1st month of 
trading 
Book-building  1569 Mean  24.53 31.91 33.51 35.82 24.44 31.64 33.12 35.22 
   Median  6.67 10.00 10.89 11.60 6.96 9.85 10.59 11.46 
   Std-dev  48.48 71.89 77.08 83.67 48.52 71.68 76.80 82.88 
Fixed price   146 Mean  5.53 8.92 10.18 13.25 5.98 8.81 9.23 12.84 
   Median  0.00 1.41 0.55 1.75 1.15 3.80 3.05 1.05 
   Std-dev  24.56 32.97 38.48 53.00 24.37 32.23 38.09 52.40 
Auction  92 Mean  13.39 20.89 19.78 23.18 13.07 20.42 18.60 21.67 
   Median  8.38 15.15 12.88 14.19 8.47 14.13 10.56 10.88 
   Std-dev  17.31 27.41 29.09 38.29 16.80 27.63 28.89 38.18 
Raw returns are computed in logarithm on the basis of the market closing price and by reference to the issue price. Adjusted returns equals raw returns minus a market index return over the same 
period. Indices are those of Table 10. For countries with several indices, the largest index is chosen. Means and standard-deviations are equally weighted. A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 39 
 
The high level of underpricing on New Markets is likely to be driven by IPOs in new 
technologies. On the basis of the sector classification available in Thomson Financial 
Datastream, we split the sample into four economic categories: industry, bank and insurance,
14 
new technologies (referred to as ‘NTIC’) and other services. Industrial firms and banks and 
insurance companies have equivalent initial returns, the latter being less underpriced than other 
services. Among all categories, new technology companies are the most underpriced. 
The breakdown of our sample according to IPO mechanisms shows that issuers leave more 
money on the table with book-building than with other procedures. The average raw return on 
the first trading day equals 24.53%. Contradicting the theory, fixed-price offerings are the least 
underpriced, with an average initial return of 5.53% and a null median return. This is probably 
due to the fact that companies going public with a fixed-price offering are more established and 
information asymmetry about their fundamental value is weaker. The underpricing of auctioned 
IPOs is in the middle with an average of 13.39%. The initial returns of book-built IPOs are more 
variable across firms than those of auctioned or fixed-price IPOs, which indicates that there is 
more uncertainty about the actual market value of companies going public with this method. It 
is also noticeable that the greater mean underpricing of these companies is attributable to 
extreme values since the median initial returns of book-buildings are lower than those of 
auctions. 
The high level of underpricing observed on the German market can be attributed to the high 
concentration of German IPOs in the hot issue period, in the Neuer Markt and in the new 
technology sector (Tables B, C, D of Appendix 1). In comparison, less money is left on the table 
by French and Turkish issuers as they use fixed-price and tender offers more frequently. France 
and Turkey are also characterised by a large proportion of IPOs in the traditional economy. 
1.4.  Economic factors explaining IPO underpricing 
Although several arguments have been put forward to explain IPO underpricing, the main 
explanatory factor is information asymmetry. 
1.4.1. The information-related explanations for IPO underpricing 
Models of asymmetric information interpret IPO underpricing as either a consequence of or a 
solution to information asymmetry between different parts of the firm or different categories of 
investors. 
Underpricing: an output of information asymmetries 
In Rock’s (1986) and Welch’s (1992) adverse selection models, IPO underpricing results from 
information asymmetries between investors. According to Rock (1986), the firm agrees to go 
public at a discounted price in order to retain less informed investors in the market. Rock 
assumes that some investors are perfectly informed whereas others are uninformed. The 
former bid only for attractively priced IPOs, while the uninformed bid indiscriminately. This 
imposes a ‘winner’s curse’ on the uninformed: in ‘bad’ offerings, they would receive full 
allocation, but in ‘good’ IPOs, they would compete with the informed and receive partial or 
null allocations. Consequently, their average return across IPOs would be negative. Provided 
uninformed investors expected such an outcome, they would withdraw from the market and 
listing firms would be left with an IPO market occupied only by perfectly informed investors. 
With this feature, only attractive IPOs would succeed and others would lack buyers and fail. 
Therefore, by voluntarily underpricing their shares, issuers help uninformed investors to at 
                                                      
14 Any other financial activity such as asset management, investment funds etc. are excluded. 40 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
least break even and thus retain them in the market. Further, according to Welch (1992), the 
uninformed mimic the informed investors’ behaviour. By underpricing its shares, the firm 
induces both the informed and the uninformed to submit buy orders in a domino effect. In 
support of this hypothesis, Amihud et al. (2003) observe that such domino effects lead to either 
large or weak subscriptions. 
The empirical literature has provided a wide international range of evidence of the ‘winner’s 
curse’ hypothesis. Rock’s model leads to several empirical predictions. Underpricing of a 
candidate firm increases because the IPO attracts the less informed. IPO underpricing increases 
the more investing in a given firm is considered to be risky (Miller and Reilly, 1987). The more 
underpriced a firm is, the more costly the search for information (Booth and Chua, 1996). In the 
case of over-subscription and high underpricing, the rationing of shares is in favour of the less 
informed, which has been observed in the case of Finland (Keloharju, 1993), the UK (Levis, 
1990) and France (Sentis, 2001). 
Other information asymmetries lead to underpricing, especially those between the firm and the 
lead manager. In Baron’s (1982) model, underpricing results from a moral hazard problem 
between the candidate firm and underwriting banks. When the firm is less informed than its 
underwriter about investor intentions to buy, managers have an incentive to allow the bank to fix 
the offering price. When the firm cannot observe the banks’ selling efforts, it has a great incentive 
to offer the bank a contract that underprices the shares and thus induces the bank to make the best 
effort. Baron’s hypothesis is not confirmed by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), who document 
underpricing even in the absence of agency costs between the underwriter and the issuing firm. 
Underpricing: a means of solving information asymmetries 
Signalling models 
Signalling models proposed by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Welch (1989), Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989), suggest that firms underprice initially to allow investors to realise larger 
proceeds from secondary operations. In doing so, firms raise less money, so that only high-
quality firms are able to underprice, and underpricing lets investors distinguish the good 
candidates from the bad ones. 
The signalling theory generates a rich set of empirical predictions. If firms underprice as a condition 
for subsequent offerings, re-issuing companies should experience greater initial underpricing. 
However, the evidence on this proposition is not clear. In general, researchers have tested the 
signalling theory by examining the relationship between underpricing and the probability, size, speed 
and the announcement effect of subsequent equity sales. Michaely and Shaw’s (1994) evidence does 
not support the signalling models with a sample of 947 IPOs between 1984 and 1988 on the US 
market. They find that the less underpriced firms at the date of IPO, generate better earnings and 
dividends in the after-market and tend to re-issue more frequently after the IPO. Two years after the 
IPO, the firm value is not directly linked to initial underpricing and capital retained by the owner. On 
the other hand, from a sample of 1,985 IPOs on the U.S. stock market between 1980 and 1986, 
Jegadeesh et al. (1993b) report a positive relationship between underpricing and the probability as 
well as the amount of seasoned equity offering or open-market insider sales. These results confirm 
Welch’s (1992) model. However, Jegadeesh et al. (1993a) offer another explanation. Initial positive 
returns may convey the information that investors are confident about the firm’s growth. Upon this 
market feedback, the firms may finance more investment opportunities by successive capital 
increases. Tests made by Jegadeesh et al. (1993a) and van Bommel and Vermaelen (2003) confirm 
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The signalling hypothesis has been more strongly validated on the French market than on other 
markets. Faugeron-Crouzet and Ginglinger (2002) find that firms going public on the second 
market have higher underpricing when re-issuing shares within four years of the IPO. 
Underpricing as an incentive to reveal information during the pre-offer phase 
Some models based on information revelation during the pre-offer period (Benveniste and 
Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhem, 1990; Spatt and Srivastava, 1991; Sherman and Titman, 
2002) stipulate that the institutional investors may know more than the issuer about the 
prospects of the company’s competitors and sector or the economy as a whole. Also, because 
they participate in the IPO market regularly, institutional investors may know more about the 
prospects of the IPO market. Finally, they know something the issuer does not know, that is 
their demand for stocks. Thus, the task for the underwriter is to acquire as many pieces of 
information as possible from them, during the pre-selling period, before setting the issue price. 
This structure challenges the underwriter to choose a mechanism that encourages truthful 
information disclosure instead of downplaying it to benefit from selling shares at the full 
information price in the after-market. The road-show or the book-building process can be seen 
as such a mechanism. Price discovery takes place in the pre-market and is then followed by the 
distribution of securities to investors. To make sure that investors truly reveal their private 
estimate of the share value, the underwriter can use stick and carrot strategies such as its power 
of allocation or underpricing. 
The book-building literature has grown remarkably in the past few years, generating a rich set of 
empirical predictions. The challenge with testing information-disclosure models is to collect 
data on investors’ bids and allocations and to identify whether these investors are informed or 
uninformed, regular or occasional clients, the type of information that is usually kept 
confidential. Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) have access to the books of one European 
investment bank participating in 23 international IPOs. They find that the empirical pattern in 
the underwriter’s allocation and pricing decisions are very consistent with the Benveniste and 
Spindt model. The underwriter favours both investors who submit limit orders and regular 
investors with a better probability of allocation. With public data and data from market makers 
in the grey market for German IPOs over 1999 and 2000, Aussenegg et al. (2005) show that 
underwriters gather information from potential investors before posting a price range, and 
investors may be rewarded for providing information prior to the onset of when-issued trading.
15 
Sherman and Titman (2002) also support the thesis of information disclosure. They observe that 
the youngest and riskiest firms are the most underpriced as the institutional investors need more 
private information to reduce uncertainty about the firm’s value. 
Other predictions of the Benveniste and Spindt model can be tested. Underpricing should be 
concentrated among the offerings with the highest level of pre-market interest, because, in those 
cases, the underwriter adjusts the price upwards within the price range but only partially in order 
to leave enough money on the table to compensate informed investors for their truthful 
disclosure. From a sample of 1,430 IPOs on the US market between 1983 and 1987, Hanley 
(1993) provides empirical support for this partial adjustment phenomenon. 
In the models of information disclosure, institutional investors are supposed to be informed and 
to subscribe to underpriced IPOs only. However, some empirical results do not confirm this 
conjecture and show that institutional investors subscribe to underpriced and overpriced IPOs in 
identical or approximately identical proportions (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Krigman et al., 
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1999; Aggarwal et al., 2002). In fact, the level of underpricing does not appear to be the sole 
factor in deciding whether or not to participate in an IPO: other factors such as size, length of 
the relationship with the candidate company, or the company’s reputation also play a role 
(Binay and Pirinsky, 2003). 
Underpricing as an incentive for financial analysts to produce information after the IPO 
In Chemmanur (1993) and more recently Aggarwal et al. (2002), the manager underprices 
shares to induce financial analysts to produce information about the firm. Underpricing the 
issue entails high initial returns, which attract the attention of potential analysts and media. 
Financial analysts’ reports then increase investors’ interest and demand in the firm’s shares, 
which presents two advantages. 
First, for Chemmanur (1993), the information role played by financial analysts favours future 
re-issuing operations. In this case, the owners hope to sell their remaining stake at a higher price 
than in the absence of underpricing. The results obtained by Spiess and Pettway (1997) on the 
US stock market do not support the predictions derived from the Chemmanur (1993) model. 
Working on a sample of 172 industrial firms introduced between 1987 and 1991 that issued 
again within the three subsequent years, they find that initial underpricing is significantly 
lower with the present value of initial and subsequent offerings and does not significantly 
determine the net profit from any of the issues for the existing shareholders. 
Second, Aggarwal et al. (2002) argue that initial underpricing followed by financial analysts’ 
activity is favourable to the insiders when a lock-up period is imposed, as it allows them to sell 
their shares at a higher price once the lock-up period expires. Tests using a sample of 621 IPOs 
on the US stock market between 1993 and 1999 confirm these predictions. Greater underpricing 
receives more attention from financial analysts, especially analysts unaffiliated with the 
underwriter, during the lock-up period. Moreover, research coverage is found to be correlated 
with stock price performance during the lock-up period and with the percentage of capital sold 
by the owner-manager at the end of the lock-up period. 
Underpricing also has an effect on research by analysts affiliated to the underwriting bank (Cliff 
and Denis, 2004). This could be a compensation for the coverage efforts made by the analysts. 
1.4.2. Underpricing as a tool for managing litigation risk 
In some countries, especially the US, and particularly since the implosion of the internet 
bubble, investors disappointed by their investments sometimes sue issuers to recover financial 
losses resulting from incorrect, distorted or omitted information. In this context, underpricing 
can be a way of diminishing lawsuit risk. For instance, Tinic (1988) observes that IPO 
underpricing in the United States has significantly increased following the Securities Act of 
1933, which mandates full and fair disclosure of the characters of securities in prospectuses. 
Recently, Lowry and Shu (2002) have confirmed the litigation-risk hypothesis. They show that 
firms with a higher risk of litigation underprice their IPOs by a greater amount as a form of 
insurance and that higher underpricing lowers lawsuit probability and expected costs. For that 
reason, investment bank underwriters would have strongly underpriced internet IPOs (Booth 
and Booth, 2003). 
However, the threat of legal suits cannot be an important motivation for underpricing in 
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1.4.3. Underpricing as a strategic behaviour of pre-IPO shareholders 
Retaining control 
Although IPO underpricing is costly for the existing shareholders, it can also favour ownership 
dispersion and thus limit the dilution of main shareholders’ control. When the shares on offer 
are underpriced, the prospect of high initial returns attracts numerous investors and makes the 
issue oversubscribed. The over-subscription gives discretion to the underwriter and the 
managers to prioritise the allocation of shares to retail investors who are not interested in 
controlling the firm. This allows the owner-manager to retain control of the firm. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, Brennan and Franks (1997) find a negative link between order size and 
initial returns over a sample of 69 IPOs at the LSE between 1986 and 1989. They show that 
sellers in the after-market are not insiders and that issued shares are first offered to retail 
investors. 
Maximising the sale price 
In some situations, the money left on the table by pre-IPO owners may be deliberate in order to 
maximise post-IPO prices. Some original owners probably prefer to put up a relatively small 
percentage of the total number of shares, so that the lack of sufficient tradeable shares results in 
a rapidly increasing price because of a relatively thin market. If lock-up rules allow it, they can 
then sell their shares at a much higher price than if they had priced them correctly at the initial 
offering. 
1.4.4. Underpricing as a means of making the secondary market more 
liquid 
Underpricing as a result of the underwriter’s price support 
By using a sample of 463 US IPOs from 1982 to 1983, Ruud (1993) argues that underwriters do 
not underprice deliberately, but price IPOs at the expected market value and support offerings 
whose prices fall below the offer price in the after-market. According to Ruud (1993), it is not 
the unconditional expectation of the true initial return that is observed, which might be around 
0, but the expectation conditional on the underwriter’s intervention. Empirical tests of Ruud’s 
(1993) hypothesis produce contradictory results. Degeorge (1995) rejects the hypothesis. 
Asquith et al. (1998) divide a sample of 560 US IPOs during 1982 and 1983 into two sub-
groups: IPOs with price support and IPOs without price support. While the distribution of initial 
returns without price support should have a mean of 0, they find that firms without price support 
are underpriced by about 18%, and that supported ones are not underpriced once the effects of 
price support are taken into account. According to Westerholm (2000), active support by 
underwriters in Finland accounts for one third of observed underpricing. 
Underpricing as a means of improving the secondary market’s liquidity 
A valuable finding in the Hanley (1993) model is to view price support as an insurance aimed at 
market makers rather than IPO investors. With a large sample of 1,523 US IPOs from 1982 to 
1987, they confirm that price support lowers market makers’ liquidity risk and accordingly leads 
them to charge lower bid-ask spreads. Thus, it helps the underwriter to be more competitive 
compared to its rivals. 
For other researchers, underpricing strengthens the secondary stock market. Because 
underpriced operations are often over-subscribed, satisfied investors get the opportunity to sell 
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the IPO day, known as ‘flipping activity’, generate brokerage revenues for intermediaries that 
recoup the loss from underpricing (Boehmer and Fishe, 2000). 
1.5. Conclusion 
Since the 1970s, theoretical research has attempted to find rational factors for IPO underpricing. 
These explanations are more or less confirmed by data. Up to now, no general and unified 
approach exists, while the anomaly persists over time and is robust different institutional 
environments. As IPO underpricing cannot be integrated in a single interpretation, an analysis 
by strata could divide underpricing into components, one of which compensating the 
uninformed investors for their participation, another one compensating the institutional 
investors for their intentions to buy or another compensating the financial analysts for their 
research. 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) suggest that the relevant explanation for underpricing changes over 
time: possibly ‘the winner’s curse’ in the eighties and information disclosure models in the 
nineties. 
2.  A comparison of IPO long-run performance across European markets 
The study of the long-run performance of firms after their IPO is of interest for issuers as well 
as for investors. Issuers may fairly wonder whether they are entering the stock market at a time 
that maximises their capitalisation, whereas, for investors, the relevant question is whether IPOs 
are attractive investments. 
By definition, the long-run performance of firms going public is measured by stock price 
performance over a long time, generally from one year to five years after the IPO. The general 
assertion is that; although IPO firms are more risky with regard to delisting rates and price 
volatility (Peristiani, 2003), they perform poorly in the long-run; yet findings are not 
homogenous and very much depend on measurement methods. 
2.1. Empirical  measures  of long-term performance 
The measurement of long-term performance is a complex and controversial matter. Three 
categories of measures are commonly implemented in the literature: buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns, cumulated abnormal returns and constant terms from multi-factor models. 
2.1.1. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return measure (BHAR) is probably the most frequently used 
methodology (see Tables 11 and 12). It represents the abnormal return of a portfolio passively 
invested in each IPO of the sample over T periods. Analytically, it equals the rate of return of a 
portfolio strategy consisting in buying stocks on their first trading day and holding them over T 
periods minus the rate of return of an appropriate benchmark over the same period of time. 
For stock i: 
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= =
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where  it r  is the rate of return of stock i on day, week, or month t, and  t I  is the rate of return of 
the selected market index in period t. T is the total number of days, weeks, or months over 
which the performance is measured.
16 t is a relative-time index starting on the issue day and the 
first return is generally calculated upon the closing price of the first day of listing. Thus, 
i BHAR  measures the long-term performance obtained by an investor who would buy stock i at 
the closure of the IPO’s first day of trading. 
The sample’s average abnormal return is then computed as the arithmetic equally-weighted 
mean of individual abnormal returns: 
∑
=
=
n
1 i
i BHAR
n
1
BHAR   (II.6),
n being the number of IPOs in the sample. 
2.1.2. Wealth relatives 
The wealth-relative measure (WR) has the same logic as BHAR, in that it also measures the 
abnormal performance of a portfolio passively invested in IPOs at the initial trading day, but 
instead of calculating a difference between compounded rates of return, the security-to-market 
relative wealth compares final wealth values through the following ratio: 
T
iT
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r 1
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+
=   (II.7).
A wealth ratio greater than one indicates overperformance while one less than one indicates 
underperformance. The WR ratio of equation (II.7) is used by Levis (1993). Relative wealth can 
also be calculated by compounding the returns in sub-periods (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995; Drobetz et al., 2005): 
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For the sample, 
∑
=
=
n
1 i
i WR
n
1
WR   (II.9).
The null hypothesis of BHAR or WR is preferably tested with a bootstrapped and skewness-
adjusted t-statistic. The distribution of long-term performances has been shown to be skewed to 
the right, which biases negatively the usual t-statistic (Kothari and Warner, 1997; Lyon et al., 
1999). 
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2.1.3. Cumulative abnormal returns 
For a robustness check, most researchers also use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The 
market-adjusted return
17 of IPO i on month t is defined as: 
t it it I r AR − =   (II.10),
and the cumulative abnormal return of IPO i is obtained by adding together the monthly 
abnormal returns from month 1 to T : 
∑
=
=
T
1 t
it i AR CAR   (II.11).
The average benchmark-adjusted cumulative return of IPOs following introduction is the 
arithmetic equally-weighted mean of individual cumulative abnormal returns: 
∑
=
=
n
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CAR   (II.12),
The statistical significance of CAR is tested by: 
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n CAR
CAR t
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σ
  (II.13),
where  2 σ  is the average monthly cross-sectional variance of  it AR  over T months and cov the 
first–order auto-covariance of the  t AR  series, with  ∑
=
=
n
1 i
it t AR
n
1
AR . 
2.1.4. Multi-factor models 
Several authors have shown empirically that when controlling for effects such as size or book-
to-market, the long-term underperformance of IPOs decreases, or even disappears. This finding 
justifies the use of multi-factor models, in which stock or portfolio returns are regressed on a 
fixed number of common factors, the first factor being invariably the market return and the 
intercept representing the mean abnormal performance. 
The Fama and French (1992) three-factor model 
The Fama-French model represents the stock returns in function of three common factors: the 
market return, the size effect and the book-to-market effect, as follows: 
( ) T ,... 2 , 1 t e HML h SMB s r I r r pt t p t p ft t p ft pt p = + + + − + = − β α   (II.14),
where  pt r  is the return on a portfolio p of IPOs for month t,  ft r  is a monthly short-term risk-
free rate,  t I  is the monthly return of a market proxy,  p β  is the beta of portfolio p,  t SMB  is the 
                                                      
17 Monthly abnormal returns are not adjusted for systematic risk. Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1991) and 
Clarkson and Thompson (1990), among others, demonstrated that the average IPOs’ betas declined with 
the length of time after the issue and that the mean difference in betas between IPOs and other firms was 
too small to have a significant effect on the results. Ritter (1991) underlined that, in the case betas of IPOs 
were systematically stronger than those of other firms, measured underperformance would be thus 
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difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and large stocks on month 
t,  p s  is the sensitivity of portfolio p to the factor SMB,  t HML  is the difference in the returns of 
a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-markets on month t, 
T is the length in months of the period of observations,  pt e  is an error term. The estimate of the 
intercept  p α  provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return on the 
calendar portfolio is zero. 
The estimation of the parameters of equation (II.14) entails several methodological problems: 
the definition of the different months t, the choice of the index I, the choice of the regression 
methodology, the formation of portfolios p, SMB and HML. 
Lyon et al. (1999) support use of calendar-time portfolios. The monthly returns are calculated 
from closing prices at the end of each month. The calendar-time regressions capture excess 
returns starting on the first day of the month following the month of the IPO. Returns between 
the offering date and the end of the first month are not incorporated in the analysis. This 
approach controls for the non-independence of returns over time. 
The number of IPOs is not constant from month to month, thus weighted least-squares should 
be used to account for the time-varying number of observations used to create the calendar 
portfolios (Krigman et al.,1999). 
Calendar portfolios (p,  SMB,  HML) are value-weighted. Fama and French (1993, 1996) 
document that three-factor models have systematic problems in explaining the average returns 
on categories of small stocks. Loughran and Ritter (2000) confirm that multi-factor regressions 
fail in detecting abnormal returns that are present especially when the target population 
comprises small stocks like typical IPOs. Value-weighting is used to avoid giving more weight 
to small stocks. 
The Carhart ‘s (1997) model 
Jegadeesh et al. (1993a) and Carhart (1997), among others, have shown momentum in stock 
returns to be a significant factor in explaining performance. Carhart (1997) adds a fourth factor 
to the Fama-French model, MOM, which is defined as the equally-weighted average return of 
firms with the highest 30% returns minus the equally-weighted average of firms with the lowest 
30% returns on the preceding month. Regression (II.14) is transformed as follows: 
( ) T ,... 2 , 1 t e MOM m HML h SMB s r I r r pt t p t p t p ft t p ft pt p = + + + + − + = − β α   (II.15),
where  t MOM  is the difference in the returns of the highest 30% and the 30% lowest on month 
t-1. 
The Eckbo et al. (2000) model 
Eckbo et al. (2000) propose a six-factor model including the market excess return and five other 
mainly macroeconomic factors: 
( ) ( )
() T ,... 2 , 1 t e Tbill e y 1 y 30 d
UI c AAA BBB b RPC a r I r r
pt t p t p
t p t p t p ft t p ft pt p
= + + − +
+ − + + − + = − ∆ β α
  (II.16).
t RPC ∆  is the change of consumption level in non-durable goods per habitant on month t ; 
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BBB during month t ;  t UI  is the unanticipated inflation on month t ;  ( )t y 1 y 30 −  is the yield 
difference between 30-year government bonds and 1 year government bonds on month t  ; 
t Tbill  is the yield difference between 90 days treasury notes and 30 days treasury notes. 
Of these three models, the most popular in the literature is Fama-French, followed by Carhart. 
2.1.5. Benchmark selection 
Several studies (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Stehle et al., 2000; Schuster, 2002; Drobetz et al., 
2005; etc.) show that long-term performance is sensitive to benchmarks. According to Loughran 
and Ritter (2000), using an official market index may lead to underestimation of 
underperformance, because it includes some issuing firms. Several authors, especially Brav and 
Gompers (1997), Stehle et al. (2000), Brav et al. (2000), argue that benchmarks built upon size 
and book-to-market give more reliable results. 
2.2.  Empirical results on long-term performance: previous literature 
The major result, broadly accepted but recently challenged, is that IPOs perform badly over one 
to five years following their introduction on the stock market. This result has also been 
established in a large number of countries. Table 14 sums up the findings of the main articles 
that provide empirical evidence of IPOs’ long-run underperformance in Europe. 
The underperformance measured in European countries is generally lower than that observed on 
US stock markets
18. On some European stock markets, this long-term underperformance has 
been challenged (Table 15), especially in France and in Switzerland, and more surprisingly, a 
positive abnormal performance has been observed on the Swedish and Greek markets. 
Finally, some authors (Brav et al., 2000; Drobetz et al., 2005; Álvarez and González, 2005) 
show that measured performance strongly depends on the selected methodology. According to 
Brav et al., 2000, the underperformance measured with traditional indexes on the US markets 
disappears with an index formed with firms similar in terms of size and book-to-market. 
2.3.  IPO long-run performance in Europe in recent years (1995-2004) 
In this sub-section, we report the long-term performance measured on our sample (Appendix 1) 
over two time horizons: the first year and the first three years following the initial issue. Given 
that price data are not necessarily available for each IPO up to one year and three years after the 
first listing, the size of our sample
19, initially 2,104, decreases to 2,026 when measuring one-
year performance, and to 1,846 when measuring 3-year performance. Long-term performance is 
estimated as follows. In a first stage, daily returns are calculated in logarithmic terms using 
closing prices for stocks and market indices. In a second stage, three measures of long-term 
performance are computed on the basis of daily returns: buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) 
according to equations (II.5) and (II.6), wealth relative ratios (WR) as in equations (II.7) and 
(II.9), and cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) as in equations (II.10), (II.11) and (II.12). Means, 
medians and standard deviations of these measures are reported in Table 16 for each country 
and each index. As for the analysis of initial underpricing, we disaggregate the sample by sector 
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underperformance on the US markets. 
19 This sample represents 40.38% of the total number of IPOs reported by the WFE during the same 
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categories, market segments, sub-periods and floatation mechanisms. Comparative results are 
provided in Tables 18, 19 and 20. 
Consistent with most studies, and notably those cited in Table 14, the long-term abnormal 
returns of our sample are frequently negative, but vary over time and across countries. More 
importantly, levels of underperformance across countries and market indices show that results 
are not benchmark-dependent but differ across methodologies. Whereas evidence of 
underperformance at the one-year term is unclear (the average first-year CAR equals –21.59% 
but the average first-year BHAR of –1.52 % is not significantly different from zero and the WR 
measure exceeds 1), we find a significant three-year underperformance with each measure: -
32.61% for BHAR, 0.87 for WR, and –87.19% for CAR). Similar to initial returns, the standard 
deviations show a great variability of performance across IPO stocks. Further, median long-run 
returns are inferior to mean returns in all cases and the distribution of performance is skewed to 
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Table 14. Empirical evidence of IPOs’ long-term underperformance in Europe 
Country Authors Period  Sample  size  Methodology  Horizon  Mean abnormal 
performance 
BHAR -47.42% 
Austria  Aussenegg (2006)  1984-1993  57 
WR 
3 years 
0.73 
BHAR -73.95% 
 Aussenegg  (2006)  1984-1991  51 
WR 
5 years 
0.64 
Finland  Keloharju (1993)  1984-1989  79  BHAR  3 years  –21% 
France  Brounen and Eichholtz (2002)  1984-1999  17  CAR  1 year  –12.62% 
  Chahine (2004a)  1996-1998  168  BHAR  2 years  –9.94% 
  Leleux and Muzyka (1997)  Nov.87-Mar.91  56  CAR  3 years  –29.2% 
Germany  Jaskiewicz et al. (2005)  1990-2000  -  BHAR  3 years  -32.8% 
 Ljungqvist  (1997)  1970-1993  180  BHAR  3  years  –12.11% 
  Sapusek (1998)  1983-1993  142  CAR  3 years  –20% 
 Stehle  et al. (2000)  1960-1992  187  BHAR  3 years  –6% 
CAR -66.80% 
Poland  Jelic and Briston  1991-1999  19 
BHAR 
3 years 
-50.93% 
Portugal  Duque and Almeida (2000)  1992-1998  21  CAR  1 year  –2.80% 
Spain  Álvarez and González (2005)  1987-1997  56  BHAR  3 years  From –14.16% to –31.11% 
according to the benchmark 
 Jaskiewicz  et al. (2005)  1990-2000  -  BHAR  3 years  -36.7% 
Switzerland  Kunz and Aggarwal (1994)  1983-1989  42  AR  3 years  -6.1% 
United-Kingdom  1984-1999 24  CAR  –4.53% 
 
Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) 
   BHAR 
1 year 
–5.83% 
 Khurshed  et al. (1999)  1991-1995  240  BHAR  3 years  -17.81% 
  Leleux and Muzyka (1997)  Nov.87-Mar.91  220  CAR  3 years  –21.8% 
 Levis  (1993)  1980-1988  483  CAR  3  years  From –8.31% to -22.96% 
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Table 15. Empirical evidence refuting IPOs’ long-term underperformance in Europe 
Country  Authors  Period  Sample size  Methodology Horizon  Mean abnormal performance 
Belgium  Leleux and Muzyka (1997)  Nov.87-Mar.91  8  CAR  3 years  n.s. 
France  Degeorge and Derrien (2001b)  1991-1998  243  CAR / BHAR 3 years  n.s. 
Germany  Leleux and Muzyka (1997)  Nov.87-Mar.91  18  CAR  3 years  n.s. 
Greece  Nounis (2003)  1994-2002  254  AR  1 year  +14.68% 
Netherlands  Doeswijk et al. (2005)  1977-2001  154  BHAR  1 and 3 
years  n.s. 
  Leleux and Muzyka (1997)  Nov.87-Mar.91  5  CAR  3 years  n.s. 
BHAR 36.53% 
Poland  Aussenegg (2000)  1991-1997  45 
WR 
1 years 
1.263 
BHAR n.s. 
 Aussenegg  (2000)  1991-1997  45 
WR 
2 and 3 
years  1.028 and 0.924 
Spain  Álvarez and González (2005)  1987-1997  56  Fama-French 3 years  n.s. 
CAR +18.89% 
Sweden  Brounen and Eichholtz (2002)  1984-1999  13 
BHAR 
1 year 
+22.16% 
 Loughran  et al. (1994)  1980-1990  162  BHAR  3 years  +1.2% 
BHAR  -1.69% (n.s) or +5.12% 
in function of the index 
Switzerland  Drobetz et al. (2005) 1983-2000  120 
CAR 
3 years 
–7.45%% or –1.02% (n.s.) 
in function of the index 
  Kunz and Aggarwal (1994)  1983-1989  42  AR  3 years  -6.1% 
United-Kingdom  Brown (1999)  1990-1995  232  BHAR  3 years  n.s. 
 Levis  (2004)  2000  23 for Main 
Market  AR  <= 1 year  Over-performance from +15.6% 
to +36.9% in function of the index 
France, Germany Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland 
Schuster (2003)  1988-1998  972  BHAR  3 years  +8.44% 
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Table 16. Long-term performance of IPOs in Europe by country from 1995 to 2004 
Country Index    Buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (in%)
Wealth 
relative ratios (in %) 
Cumulated abnormal 
returns (in %) 
     1
st year  first 3 years  1
st year  first 3 years  1
st year  first 3 years 
All Largest Mean  -1.52 -32.61
*** 1.09
*** 0.87
*** -21.59
*** -87.19
***
   Number  2,026 1,846 2,026 1,846 2,026 1,846
   Median  -25.06 -43.35 0.82 0.51 -16.96 -67.27
   Std-dev  115.51 159.53 1.26 1.84 81.41 140.57
Austria ATI  Mean  4.74 -31.98 1.10 0.86 -5.35 -100.06
**
   Number  22 21 22 21 22 21
   Median  -2.66 -25.02 0.99 0.84 -0.98 -18.73
   Std-dev  71.70 91.28 0.71 0.79 57.31 184.24
Belgium BEL20  Mean  19.88 14.98 1.30
** 1.37 2.11 -44.02
***
   Number  57 51 57 51 57 51
   Median  -4.68 -48.62 1.07 0.56 6.18 -59.59
   Std-dev  103.80 180.30 1.00 2.54 72.73 112.19
Finland HEX  General  Mean  -14.00 -61.47
*** 1.05 0.70
*** -25.32
** -70.07
***
   Number  44 43 44 43 44 43
   Median  -17.55 -33.81 0.94 0.53 -15.01 -66.25
   Std-dev  96.82 120.76 0.86 0.63 84.95 89.68
France CAC40  Mean  11.44* -36.33*** 1.21*** 1.00 -8.72** -56.86***
   Number  362 355 362 355 362 355
   Median  -20.46 -43.87 0.87 0.58 -11.32 -51.93
   Std-dev  128.33 124.85 1.38 1.28 77.15 115.40
 SBF250  Mean  11.63* -36.96*** 1.22*** 0.99 -8.22** -57.61***
   Number  362 355 362 355 362 355
   Median  -20.02 -47.10 0.88 0.58 -11.06 -52.10
   Std-dev  128.30 123.65 1.38 1.27 77.28 115.10
Germany DAX200  Mean  -19.57
** -53.69
*** 1.09 0.59
*** -47.37
*** -187.85
***
   Number  410 408 410 408 410 408
   Median  -53.27 -64.66 0.68 0.20 -41.35 -161.21
   Std-dev  153.98 211.40 1.75 2.77 104.74 170.83
 DAX30  Mean  -8.75 -30.28
*** 1.13 0.66
** -38.47
*** -167.60
***
   Number  410 408 410 408 410 408
   Median  -43.38 -40.78 0.70 0.24 -37.41 -140.73
   Std-dev  151.48 210.89 1.76 2.94 97.67 164.94
 FAZ  General  Mean  -7.60 -31.06
*** 1.14 0.67
** -37.94
*** -171.13
***
   Number  410 408 410 408 410 408
   Median  -43.73 -43.65 0.70 0.23 -36.71 -146.50
   Std-dev  151.90 211.55 1.83 3.18 98.70 166.35
Greece  Mean  36.29
*** 38.10
* 1.29
*** 1.30
** 11.87
** -4.63
 
Athens  
SE General  Number  174 148 174 148 174 148
   Median  -8.54 -17.24 0.99 0.85 3.60 -3.65
   Std-dev  147.60 250.91 0.95 1.66 64.22 85.17
Italy MIB30  Mean  -7.01 -30.47
*** 1.02 0.84
*** -11.82
** -45.00
***
   Number  135 127 135 127 135 127
   Median  -17.86 -33.77 0.84 0.69 -15.65 -37.54A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 53 
 
   Std-dev  63.14 61.73 0.67 0.67 53.78 80.48
  Mean  -8.63
* -37.24
*** 1.02 0.84
*** -12.95
*** -50.23
***
 
Milan Comit  
Global  Number  135 127 135 127 135 127
   Median  -20.40 -38.82 0.84 0.69 -15.93 -45.11
   Std-dev  63.46 62.43 0.67 0.67 53.94 80.62
 
Table 16. Cont’d 
Country Index    Buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (in%)
Wealth 
relative ratios (in %) 
Cumulated abnormal 
returns (in %) 
     1
st year  first 3 years  1
st year  first 3 years  1
st year  first 3 years 
Netherlands AEX  Mean  5.36 -18.81 0.99 0.67 -12.77 -66.96
***
   Number  46 44 46 44 46 44
   Median  -17.67 -36.07 0.89 0.60 -8.56 -44.79
   Std-dev  129.71 117.64 1.10 0.94 71.96 119.60
  Mean  5.99 -17.50 1.14 0.91 -11.83 -66.16
***
 
Amsterdam SE 
All Shares  Number  46 44 46 44 46 44
   Median  -16.05 -37.91 0.91 0.60 -6.18 -46.47
   Std-dev  130.17 118.63 1.14 0.99 71.89 120.69
Poland WGI  20  Mean  -25.57
*** -30.71
** 0.82
*** 0.86
*** -38.52
*** -71.10
***
   Number  81 76 81 76 81 76
   Median  -32.52 -48.85 0.66 0.53 -37.29 -64.17
   Std-dev  48.09 113.83 0.49 1.30 65.26 115.12
 WGI  Mean  -28.84
*** -42.18
*** 0.80
*** 0.77
*** -41.83
*** -80.83
***
   Number  81 76 81 76 81 76
   Median  -38.88 -58.46 0.68 0.48 -37.31 -76.50
   Std-dev  46.51 111.78 0.47 1.08 65.84 115.59
Portugal PSI20  Mean  11.48 -19.24 1.16 0.86 0.17 -29.58
*
   Number  16 15 16 15 16 15
   Median  3.14 -17.25 1.06 0.91 4.19 -6.21
   Std-dev  58.38 50.03 0.69 0.41 54.36 60.56
Spain  Mean  -6.48 -29.30
*** 0.96 0.85
* -6.79 -27.00
***
 
Madrid  
SE Index  Number  35 33 35 33 35 33
   Median  -14.76 -37.51 0.87 0.71 -8.47 -25.99
   Std-dev  49.23 58.15 0.43 0.52 45.49 56.70
Sweden OMX  30  Mean  8.69 -47.61
*** 1.17 0.97 -12.45 -63.31
***
   Number  94 89 94 89 94 89
   Median  -20.30 -42.60 0.87 0.77 -13.06 -26.09
   Std-dev  120.61 79.86 1.09 1.23 77.41 135.87
Switzerland SPI  Mean  -19.84
*** -27.10
*** 0.85
** 0.84 -37.03
*** -74.44
***
   Number  60 59 59 59 60 59
   Median  -22.87 -47.30 0.83 0.64 -18.67 -45.93
   Std-dev  49.60 75.57 0.50 0.86 89.53 133.97
  Mean  -17.21
*** -32.81
*** 0.89
* 0.82
* -32.76
*** -75.16
***
 
Vontobel  
Small 
Companies  Number  60 59 60 59 60 59
   Median  -17.16 -48.10 0.89 0.56 -9.63 -58.68
   Std-dev  48.14 79.66 0.47 0.81 90.15 130.4254 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
 SMI  Mean  -18.17
*** -20.54
** 0.88
* 0.90 -35.76
*** -68.85
***
   Number  60 59 60 59 60 59
   Median  -20.63 -39.84 0.84 0.68 -17.06 -41.20
   Std-dev  50.28 75.33 0.53 0.93 89.48 134.53
Turkey  ISE National 
100  Mean  -39.97
*** -191.51
*** 0.86
** 0.69
*** -28.20
*** -66.33
***
   Number  76 71 76 71 76 71
   Median  -40.19 -108.46 0.70 0.51 -31.86 -63.07
   Std-dev  54.15 256.22 0.60 0.64 55.01 84.75
 
Table 16. Cont’d 
Country Index    Buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (in%)
Wealth 
relative ratios (in %) 
Cumulated abnormal 
returns (in %) 
     1
st year  first 3 years  1
st year  first 3 years  1
st year  first 3 years 
UK  Mean  -10.96
*** -27.74
*** 0.97 0.78
*** -35.71
*** -102.85
***
 
FTSE  
All Shares  Number  414 306 414 306 414  306
   Median  -26.24 -50.14 0.76 0.48 -25.22  -73.18
   Std-dev  82.54 64.18 1.15 1.07 84.87  153.30
 FTSE  100  Mean  -9.92
** -24.88
*** 0.98 0.80
*** -35.03
*** -100.16
***
   Number  414 306 414 306 414  306
   Median  -25.47 -47.48 0.77 0.50 -24.22  -70.22
   Std-dev  82.87 64.32 1.18 1.10 85.13  153.54
 FTSE  350  Mean  -10.87
*** -27.37
*** 0.97 0.78
*** -35.72
*** -102.68
***
   Number  414 306 414 306 414  306
   Median  -26.22 -49.70 0.76 0.48 -25.32  -72.84
   Std-dev  82.70 64.24 1.16 1.07 85.01  153.41
Long-term abnormal returns are measured by buy and hold returns and cumulated abnormal returns over 1 year and 3 years 
following the IPO. Means and standard-deviations are equally weighted. ***,**,* indicates statistical significance 
respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
Table 17. Long-term performances of IPOs in Europe by market segment and period from 1995 to 2004 
Panel A: by market segment 
  Buy and hold returns 
(in %) 
Wealth 
relative ratios (in %) 
Cumulated abnormal
returns (in %)  Segment 
  1
st year  first 3 years 1
st year  First 3 years  1
st year  first 3 years 
Traditional markets  Mean  -7.20
*** -31.72
*** 1.01
*** 0.93
*** -17.27
*** -56.86
***
  Number  796 752 796 752 796  752
  Median  -20.02 -42.67 0.86 0.65 -13.31  -44.22
  Std-dev  69.60 101.66 0.69 1.02 66.09  114.62
New markets  Mean  -2.16 -35.68
*** 1.14
*** 0.73
*** -33.11
*** -136.12
***
  Number  907 809 907 809 907  809
  Median  -35.42 -45.53 0.74 0.30 -30.57  -117.27
  Std-dev  141.37 161.30 1.68 2.41 95.68  159.40A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 55 
 
Table 17. Cont’d 
Panel B: by period 
  Buy and hold returns
(in %) 
Wealth 
relative ratios (in %) 
Cumulated abnormal 
returns (in %) 
Period 
  1
st year  first 3 
years  1
st year  first 3 
years  1
st year  first 3 
years 
1995-1997  Mean  4.98 -41.42
** 1.18
*** 1.27
*** -5.80
* -45.37
***
  Number  389 389 389 389 389 389
  Median  -19.17 -92.01 0.90 0.61 -10.37 -49.23
  Std-dev  142.65 323.01 1.62 3.49 59.18  107.88
1998-2000  Mean  -1.15 -31.44
*** 1.10
*** 0.74
*** -26.25
*** -104.25
***
  Number  1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289
  Median  -30.59 -40.65 0.76 0.46 -24.66 -76.35
  Std-dev  118.96 63.63 1.26 1.02 90.18  149.00
2000-2004  Mean  -10.17
*** -21.15
*** 0.97
*** 0.95
*** -21.97
*** -53.20
***
  Number  348 168 348 168 348 168
  Median  -13.24 -38.35 0.89 0.77 -10.70 -27.78
  Std-dev  49.58 84.89 0.58 0.90 64.94  112.07
 
Panel C: by period and segment 
  Buy and hold returns
(in %) 
Wealth 
relative ratios (in %) 
Cumulated abnormal 
returns (in %) 
Period Segment 
  1
st year  first 3 years 1
st year  first 3 
years  1
st year  first 3 years
1995-1997 Traditional  Mean  -4.92 -61.09
*** 1.02
*** 0.83
*** -9.98
*** -52.37
***
   Number  237 237 237 237 237 237
   Median  -18.25 -86.88 0.90 0.60 -11.17 -53.52
   Std-dev  65.48 128.89 0.57 0.80 49.35 82.71
 New  Mean  51.29 18.04 1.75
*** 2.38
*** 2.00  -63.13
***
   Number  64 64 64 64 64 64
   Median  -20.30 -121.30 0.93 0.46 -7.84  -77.73
   Std-dev  302.18 550.92 3.66 7.88 87.39  162.40
1998-2000 Traditional  Mean  -9.35
*** -19.34
*** 1.00
*** 0.96
*** -22.59
*** -60.60
***
   Number  458 458 458 458 458 458
   Median  -26.58 -37.50 0.79 0.66 -20.09 -42.15
   Std-dev  76.07 76.07 0.78 1.10 74.78  127.11
 New  Mean  -3.01 -41.69
*** 1.15
*** 0.55
*** -36.69
*** -154.18
***
   Number  650 650 650 650 650 650
   Median  -42.19 -44.64 0.69 0.25 -37.65  -138.10
   Std-dev  134.36 47.79 1.57 0.89 102.62 160.3356 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
2000-2004 Traditional  Mean  -2.74 -9.09 1.03
*** 1.09
*** -10.28
* -45.51
***
   Number  101 57 101 57 101  57
   Median  -3.92 -27.58 1.02 0.89 0.47  -24.95
   Std-dev  43.53 126.27 0.48 1.11 55.79  123.19
 New  Mean  -17.01
*** -30.71
*** 0.88
*** 0.85
*** -32.73
*** -61.71
***
   Number  193 95 193 95 193  95
   Median  -22.70 -44.87 0.82 0.75 -17.26 -28.81
   Std-dev  46.27 47.05 0.58 0.73 68.15  108.40
Long-term abnormal returns are measured by buy and hold returns, wealth returns and cumulated abnormal returns over 1 year and 3 
years following the IPO. Means and standard-deviations are equally weighted. Indices are those of Table 16. For countries with 
several indices, the largest index is selected. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
Table 18. Long-term performances of IPOs in Europe by economic sector 
from 1995 to 2004 
  Buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (in %) 
Wealth 
relative ratios (in %) 
Cumulated abnormal 
returns (in %) 
Sector 
  1
st year  first 3 years 1
st year  first 3 
years  1
st year  first 3 
years 
Industry  Mean  -6.57 -42.07
*** 1.02
*** 0.91
*** -17.06
*** -56.45
***
  Number  623 563 623 563 623 563
  Median  -24.51 -44.88 0.82 0.63 -17.92 -48.14
  Std-dev  98.33 153.10 0.81 1.09 62.57 107.51
Bank-Insurance  Mean  -3.40 -27.62
** 1.01
*** 1.03
*** -12.01
* -30.78
**
  Number  82 74 82 74 82 74
  Median  -14.23 -19.43 0.90 0.99 -8.40 0.19
  Std-dev  78.44 115.37 0.63 0.72 56.91 108.51
NTIC  Mean  -1.72 -31.68
*** 1.12
*** 0.74
*** -29.60
*** -129.23
***
  Number  718 675 653 617 718 675
  Median  -31.68 -46.53 0.75 0.27 -21.60 -115.30
  Std-dev  118.28 124.81 1.40 1.66 98.80 156.10
Other services  Mean  4.40 -26.37
*** 1.14
*** 0.95
*** -16.04
*** -76.18
***
  Number  664 589 664 589 664 589
  Median  -21.41 -40.65 0.87 0.61 -12.51 -49.60
  Std-dev  128.39 194.89 1.48 2.56 77.90 142.41
Long-term abnormal returns are measured by buy and hold returns, wealth returns and cumulated abnormal returns over 
1 year and 3 years following the IPO. Means and standard-deviations are equally weighted. Indices are those of Table 
16. For countries with several indices, the largest index is selected. ***,**,* indicates statistical significance 
respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
 A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 57 
 
Table 19. Long-term performances of IPOs in Europe by floatation mechanism 
from 1995 to 2004 
  Buy and hold returns 
(in %) 
Wealth 
relative ratios (in %) 
Cumulated abnormal 
returns (in %) 
Mechanism 
  1
st year  first 3 
years  1
st year  first 3 
years  1
st year  first 3 years
Book-building  Mean  1.05 -24.18
*** 1.12
*** 0.86
*** -21.68
*** -94.84
***
  Number  1,510 1,351 1,510 1,351 1,510 1,351
  Median  -24.74 -41.65 0.83 0.49 -16.73 -69.13
  Std-dev  122.19 157.43 1.37 2.01 84.35 147.89
Fixed price  Mean  -14.15
*** -104.29
*** 1.01
*** 0.84
*** -16.16
*** -60.29
***
  Number  141 138 141 138 141 138
  Median  -23.55 -65.38 0.84 0.57 -15.59 -51.30
  Std-dev  77.30 209.34 0.72 0.91 59.13 101.47
Auction  Mean  -1.64 -31.81 1.06
*** 1.11
*** -14.40
** -47.94
***
  Number  91 88 91 88 91 88
  Median  -29.29 -65.37 0.78 0.56 -19.27 -55.78
  Std-dev  92.72 186.93 0.85 1.77 68.93 107.02
Long-term abnormal returns are measured by buy and hold returns, wealth returns and cumulated abnormal returns over 
1 year and 3 years following the IPO. Means and standard-deviations are equally weighted. Indices are those of Table 
16. For countries with several indices, the largest index is selected. ***,**,* indicates statistical significance 
respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
Regarding national differences, at the three-year horizon, substantial underperformance is found 
for all European countries, except Belgium and Portugal. For Portugal, the statistical 
significance of underperformance is weak, which confirms the low level of underperformance 
found by Duque and Almeida (2000). As for the Greek market, abnormal returns are positive for 
any time horizon. This finding is consistent with Nounis (2003) who measures an average over-
performance of 14.68% during the first year of listing on a sample of Greeks IPOs. 
As for the comparison of market segments, sub-periods, sectors and pricing mechanisms, our 
performance measures do not yield identical results with one-year returns but converge with 
three-year returns. Over a three-year interval, New markets perform less well than traditional 
market segments according to all measures. Three-year CARs for growth markets are 2.4 times 
as negative as those observed for traditional markets. Further, the cold periods of 1995-1997 and 
2001-2004 exhibit lower underperformances than the intermediary hot period. It is noteworthy 
that post-2000 IPO performance rises to the pre 1998 level. 
During the hot period, the underperformance spread between new and traditional markets 
widens considerably: the performance of a portfolio invested in New Market IPOs during the 
years 1998-2000 is one third of the performance of an equivalent portfolio invested on 
traditional segments. The poor performance of growth market IPOs is mainly due to the weak 
returns of new technology IPOs. On the basis of sector classification available in Thomson 
Financial Datastream, industry and services other than bank and insurance have equivalent 
levels of underperformance. Among all categories, new technology companies underperform the 
most, with banks and insurance companies having the lowest level of underperformance. 58 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
Lastly, with regard to IPO mechanisms, we find that, over the three years following the initial 
offering, book-built IPOs perform poorly in comparison to fixed-price and auctioned IPOs. The 
performance of stocks issued at a fixed price is comparable to those of auction-issued stocks, yet 
the latter have the least underperformance. 
2.4.  Theoretical explanations for IPO long-run underperformance 
Many factors, like window-dressing, IPO timing, market optimism etc., are claimed to explain 
long-term underperformance of firms going public. These explanations are not exclusive and 
can occur simultaneously, which makes it more difficult to test them individually. Thus, the 
same test can confirm or reject several hypotheses at the same time. Furthermore, some of these 
hypotheses, like IPO timing, may explain both IPO initial underpricing and long-run 
underperformance. 
2.4.1. The window-dressing hypothesis 
When a firm goes public, so as to reduce the risk of failure of the IPO, the managers have an 
incentive to present the most favourable financial situation. According to Teoh et al. (1998), 
managers are ready to manipulate reported earnings around initial public offerings, for instance 
by altering discretionary accounting accruals, in order to give the stock market a false signal on 
the future profitability of the candidate firm and thus reduce the cost of capital. The authors 
observe that the more earnings management there is, the more stock performance decreases after 
three years. This hypothesis assumes the lack of investors’ ability to correctly estimate the 
firm’s value at the time of the offering. After a mean three-year delay, investors would be able 
to identify the accounting adjustments and would reallocate their portfolios. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Pastor-Llorca and Poveda-Fuentes (2006) notice that Spanish IPO firms make use of 
discretionary accruals to report higher earnings in the IPO year and show that firms with a 
higher level of discretionary accruals underperform more in the long-run. Roosenboom et al. 
(2003) obtain a similar negative relation between discretionary accruals and long-run stock price 
performance over a sample of 64 Dutch IPOs; yet, they find that earnings are managed in the 
first year as a public company but not in the years before the IPO. 
Earnings management is likely to be observed at start-up firms whose managers are induced to 
manipulate results in the short-term in order to diversify the sources of funds and to increase the 
amount of funds raised. Traditional methods of valuation would not be well-adapted for those 
companies, which leaves important margins when estimating their values. 
2.4.2. The timing hypothesis 
According to the timing hypothesis, managers choose a window of opportunity to launch an 
IPO, this window being identified as a function of the firm’s performance or market conditions. 
First, managers prefer to take their firms public when they have performed well earlier, and 
probably the IPO date is conditional on the firm’s cycle of activity and operational performance. 
Second, the window of opportunity for an IPO may be determined by market conditions. In a 
bullish market, the number of IPOs tends to increase because the placement of stocks is easier, 
the risk of failure of an IPO is lower and securities are priced higher, which softens the cost of 
initial underpricing. Loughran and Ritter (1995) as well as Helwege and Liang (2001) show that 
firms going public during ‘hot markets’ have more severe long-term underperformance than 
other firms. 
Because of the existence of ‘hot markets’ and ‘cold markets’, IPOs cluster by periods of time, 
and this cyclicality increases initial underpricing of IPO firms and long-term underperformance. A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 59 
 
Schultz (2003) calls this hypothesis ‘pseudo market-timing’ and demonstrates that long-term 
underperformance is an artefact linked to IPO clustering. 
Lewis et al. (2000) show, from a sample of 1,955 IPOs on the US stock market between 1988 
and 1995, that firms that go bankrupt have weaker long-term returns. They suppose that periods 
of ‘hot markets’ attract ‘good’ firms as well as ‘bad’ firms, the latter being offered to the market 
by less scrupulous intermediaries. In this context, investors would not be able to estimate the 
bad firms’ actual probability of bankruptcy at the time of their IPOs but, in the long run, the 
poor performance of bad IPOs would pull down the average performance of all IPOs. In Europe, 
no study has formally tested the market timing hypothesis. The recent article by Derrien and 
Kecskés (2006) partly fills this gap by providing empirical evidence of market timing for AIM IPOs 
in the UK. 
2.4.3. The delisting hypothesis 
Benninga et al. (2005) explain IPO long-term underperformance by the firms’ ability to delist 
voluntarily (eg via mergers, market transfers). Sentis’s (2002) game theory model takes account 
of the possibility of voluntary delisting in the case of takeovers by external firms. His model 
predicts that IPO firms performing well are taken over and consequently delisted, so that only 
the least performing issuing firms remain on the market and in IPO samples. 
2.4.4. Behavioural explanations 
Financial analysts’ optimism 
Post-IPO underperformance has an inverse relation to optimistic forecasts or recommendations 
by analysts during the offer period (Chahine, 2004a; Degeorge and Derrien, 2001a; Dechow et 
al., 1999; Michaely and Womack, 1999). From a sample of IPOs on the Second Marché and the 
Nouveau Marché, Chahine (2004a) finds that long-term performance is significantly correlated 
with unanticipated earnings and analysts’ earnings-forecast revisions. From there, he explains 
underperformance by analysts’ excessive optimism at the time of IPO. In the offering period, 
analysts’ favourable forecasts and recommendations encourage subscription yet, over time, 
prices converge towards fundamental values. 
Investors’ optimism 
According to Krigman et al. (1999), active buy and sell trades in the aftermarket during the first 
day of trading, the so-called ‘flipping activity’, is a good indication of future stock price 
performance. They suggest that there are periods when investors are particularly confident about 
firms’ future projects and profits, and that managers are induced to make offerings in these 
periods. Therefore, long-term underperformance is a correction for this excess of optimism. 
Consistently, for a sample of 486 European IPOs, Cornelli et al. (2006) find long-run post-IPO 
price reversal only when prices in the grey market, the ‘when-issued’ market that precedes 
IPOs, are high, indicating excessive optimism. 
For a sample of 2,288 IPOs, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) show that firms that go 
public at an overestimated price exhibit weak returns in the long term. They explain this result 
by the excess of confidence of some investors who react on the basis of private information. In 
the short term, the behaviour of these investors leads to overreaction on the market, but in the 
long term, the continuous flow of public information makes stock prices fall back to 
fundamental values. 
Other authors consider that only a small portion of investors are overoptimistic. They 
marginally influence the price in the IPO period but in the long run, the continuous flow of 60 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
public information reduces the heterogeneity of opinions between optimistic investors and 
others, and prices decrease. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) show that long-term 
underperformance is negatively correlated to opinion heterogeneity and positively correlated to 
the speed of reduction of the divergence of opinions upon the arrival of new public information. 
Houge et al. (2001) use three proxies for opinion heterogeneity: the delay between the open and 
the first trade,
 the buy-sell ratio and the bid-ask spread. In their sample of 2,025 IPOs between 
1993 and 1996 on the US stock market, long-term abnormal returns are negatively correlated 
with the three proxies. Consistently, in Gao et al. (2002) long-term performance is negatively 
linked to stock volatility on the first 20 days of trading, over a sample of 2,327 IPOs between 
1986 and 1996. 
2.4.5. Underwriting banks’ behaviour 
The underwriter’s reputation hypothesis 
According to Carter et al. (1998), based on three measures of underwriter bank prestige, mean 
long-term underperformance of firms introduced by more prestigious underwriters is weaker. 
This result acts in favour of the hypothesis of underwriter reputation, according to which the 
selection of a highly ranked underwriter would be a good signal for the market with regard to 
the risk borne in the post-IPO period. 
The price support hypothesis 
According to Ruud (1993), underwriters stabilise stock prices during a short period of time after 
the IPO so as to avoid a failure of the issue. Prices are artificially supported at a high level in the 
short run, but at the end of the stabilisation period, performance decreases. 
2.4.6. Measurement errors 
Some authors claim that abnormal performance is the outcome of measurement biases. Thus, 
empirical studies can observe negative abnormal performance when underperformance does 
actually not exist or is weak. Over a sample of 3,661 IPOs on the US market between 1935 and 
1972, Gompers and Lerner (2003) find that long-term underperformance disappears when 
considering CARs instead of BHARs. 
Market-adjusted performance is also significantly sensitive to benchmarks. Over a sample of 
120 IPOs on the Swiss market between 1983 and 2000, Drobetz et al. (2005) show that results 
are very dependant on market indices. On the basis of the BHAR methodology, the mean 
performance they observe changes from 5.12% to -1.69% when using a different benchmark. 
Cumulative abnormal returns also vary from –7.45% to –1.02% depending on the selected 
index. 
Finally, some articles show that, when risk factors other than market risk are taken into account, 
abnormal performance decreases in absolute value and converges towards zero in some cases. 
Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav et al. (2000) demonstrate that when size and book-to-
market factors are considered, abnormal performance vanishes. According to Eckbo and Norli 
(2002), this finding is reinforced when financial leverage and liquidity factors are added. 61 | 
III.  Initial underpricing, long-run performance and post-IPO 
liquidity 
This last section is devoted to the interaction between initial returns, post-IPO liquidity and 
long-term performance. The first sub-section reviews the literature and the second sub-section 
reports the empirical findings we obtained on a sample of IPOs carried out on Euronext Paris 
between 1995 and 2004 (Sample presented in Appendix 2). 
1.  Previous research relating IPO performance and after-market 
liquidity 
Most of the research that analyses the relationship between the performance of newly-listed 
firms and their liquidity addresses the link between initial returns and after-market liquidity. On 
this issue, there are two opposing theories. A theory first defended by Booth and Chua (1996) 
stipulates that underpricing is a means to ensure a diverse ownership structure and therefore 
enhance post-IPO liquidity. According to this hypothesis, post-listing spreads and adverse 
selection measures should be negatively related to underpricing. Conversely, a more recent 
theory developed by Ellul and Pagano (2006) posits that post-IPO spreads and asymmetric 
information measures increase with underpricing because underpricing is a compensation for 
illiquidity costs expected in the after-market. 
1.1. Underpricing as a means of promoting after-market liquidity: the 
liquidity-promotion hypothesis 
The process of a firm’s initial public offering is characterised by the expansion of its ownership 
structure, previously concentrated in the hands of a few parties, to include a much larger number 
of outside investors. In terms of post-IPO ownership structure, an issuer may fulfil two 
alternative objectives. 
On the one hand, a firm may carry out an IPO to broaden its ownership structure in order to 
obtain more secondary-market liquidity for its shares, a factor often considered as an important 
measure of the success of an IPO. In the worst case scenario, insufficient secondary-market 
liquidity can result in the failure or cancellation of an IPO (Corwin et al., 2004). In general, 
higher after-market liquidity helps increase the firm’s value and reduce its cost of capital in 
several ways. It encourages analysts to write and talk about the IPO and improves the issuing 
firm’s future access to capital markets by attracting investors. It reduces transaction costs in 
future equity raisings (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995) and lowers gross fees requested by investment 
banks in subsequent equity offerings (Butler et al., 2004). It also reduces the illiquidity premium 
and thus the returns required by investors to hold the firm’s shares, as shown in Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996). In addition, promoting trading 
liquidity through ownership dispersion may be an effective mechanism to impede future hostile 
takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
On the other hand, a firm carrying out an IPO may prefer to maintain a concentrated ownership 
at the expense of liquidity. A concentrated ownership structure may confer more value than a 
dispersed one as the former corporate governance arrangement gives shareholders more of an 
incentive to monitor the company’s activities to minimise agency costs. This is especially 
important for companies with a less pronounced degree of information, as large shareholders are 
more likely to intervene because the consequence of their actions can be observed by the market 
(Kahn and Winton, 1998). Therefore, some companies may deliberately forfeit liquidity in order 
to adopt a concentrated ownership structure. 
IPOs seeking secondary-market liquidity will underprice their shares because they need to 
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being at a disadvantage in terms of the information they have at their disposal, small investors 
participate in an IPO if they are compensated for the adverse selection costs they incur, that is if 
the IPO is sufficiently underpriced. 
Alternatively, firms carrying out an IPO and seeking concentrated ownership will not 
underprice their shares when issuing them as large shareholders possess superior information 
about the company’s true value and do not bear information costs. They could even be 
overpriced as large shareholders may be prepared to pay a premium for control. 
Booth and Chua (1996) develop an explanation for IPO underpricing in which the issuer’s wish 
for ownership dispersion creates an incentive to underprice. Uninformed investors incur 
additional costs in collecting information and therefore will not be induced to participate unless 
a higher degree of underpricing is offered. Their model illustrates that an optimal level of 
underpricing is reached when the issuer maximises proceeds. The ownership dispersion at 
equilibrium is partly determined by the value of secondary market liquidity. Maximising 
proceeds means promoting secondary-market liquidity through initial ownership dispersion and 
oversubscription, to the point that the rate of increase in total market value equals the rate of 
increase in total information costs. Consistent with this theory, Michaely and Shaw (1994) find 
that there is higher underpricing for IPOs that have a more diverse shareholder base. 
Higher underpricing induces broader investor participation and creates a broader ownership 
structure. These two factors are in turn positively associated with the level of post-listing 
trading, and therefore offer an explanation of how underpricing can influence liquidity. 
Miller and Reilly (1987), Hanley (1993), and Schultz and Zaman (1994) have all produced 
evidence showing that underpriced IPOs, on average, exhibit higher after-market trading 
turnover than overpriced IPOs, without clearly explaining why this is so. Reese (1998) also 
showed that there is a positive relationship between underpricing and post-listing trading 
turnover for up to three years after listing and suggested financial media coverage as a possible 
explanation. Pham et al. (2003) and Li et al. (2005b) provide evidence that a higher level of 
underpricing leads not only to increased trading turnover but also lower bid-ask spreads. Pham 
et al. (2003) argue that this relationship is established through the mediation of the ownership 
structure formed after the allocation process. They also find that overpriced IPOs are likely to 
have less debt and higher book-to-market ratios. Firms with these features are often associated 
with higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gompers, 1995), and hence receive 
greater marginal benefits from future monitoring by large shareholders. Therefore, these firms 
are less interested in underpricing their shares. 
Hahn and Ligon’s (2004) results are supportive of the notion that initial public offering 
underpricing boosts the subsequent secondary market liquidity of the stock. They find that for 
three different volume-based measures of liquidity, the turnover ratio, Amihud’s illiquidity 
measures and the average number of trades, there is a consistent significantly positive 
relationship between underpricing and liquidity. Underpricing and analyst coverage may be part 
of an overall strategy to establish liquidity for the issue. 
This last view, according to which underpricing attracts analysts’ coverage and thereby reduces 
asymmetric information in the after-market, is also defended by Li et al. (2005a). They measure 
the adverse selection spread component for a sample of 1,726 firms that went public on the 
NASDAQ between 1995 and 2000, and find that the level of asymmetric information 
immediately after the IPO decreases with underpricing, meaning that underpricing induces 
information production in the post-listing period and thus favours liquidity. Their results also 
show that the adverse selection component of the spread is smaller in the early periods of the 
after-market, and increases to a relatively stable level approximately 40 days after the initial 
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1.2.  Underpricing as a compensation for post-IPO expected illiquidity: the 
illiquidity-compensation hypothesis 
Contrary to Booth and Chua’s theory, Ellul and Pagano (2006) demonstrate that the IPO 
underpricing is an increasing function of the expected post-listing illiquidity due to asymmetric 
information. They propose a model in which investors worry about the after-market illiquidity 
that may result from asymmetric information after the IPO. The less liquid the after-market is 
expected to be, and the less predictable its liquidity, the larger the IPO underpricing, because 
IPO underpricing compensates uninformed investors who participate in the issue not only for 
adverse selection costs borne at the IPO stage but also for the expected trading costs that they 
will bear by liquidating their shares in the after-market. 
In addition, Ellul and Pagano (2006) provide empirical evidence in support of their theory using 
a sample of 337 IPOs carried out between 1998 and 2000 at the LSE, either on the Main Market 
or on AIM. Using effective spreads and two measures of asymmetric information, the 
probability of information-based trading (PIN) proposed by Easley et al. (1996) and the adverse 
selection component of the spread, they find a positive relationship between underpricing and 
post-IPO trading cost level and variability. 
1.3. Post-IPO  liquidity  and long-run performance 
The advantage of a liquid post-IPO market for the issuer should be a reduction in the firm’s cost 
of capital due to a lower liquidity risk premium required by investors. If such is the case, long-
run IPO performance should decrease with the liquidity of the after-market. Eckbo and Norli 
(2002) test this hypothesis on a sample of 6,379 NASDAQ IPOs between 1972 and 1988. They 
measure post-listing liquidity with monthly turnover computed as trading volume divided by the 
number of shares outstanding. With this measure, they observe that IPO stocks are significantly 
more liquid than non-IPO stocks similar in size and book-to-market value in the five years 
following the IPO, and that IPO stock liquidity is the greatest in the year of the initial issue. 
Therefore, they examine the risk-reducing effect of greater liquidity with a factor model that 
comprises Fama-French factors, a momentum factor and a liquidity factor. They show that the 
magnitude and the significance of the liquidity factor loadings are comparable to those of the 
momentum factor. When applied to IPO portfolios, the liquidity factor reduces expected 
portfolio returns, as predicted. 
2.  An empirical test of the relationship between IPO performance and 
after-market liquidity 
We use a sample of IPOs carried out on Euronext Paris between 1995 and 2004 (sample 
presented in Appendix 2) to analyse how IPO underpricing relates to post-IPO liquidity and 
whether secondary market liquidity has an impact on long-term performance. In particular, we 
investigate the following questions: 
1.  Does the choice of book-building as the allocation mechanism have a significant impact on 
post-IPO liquidity and performance? 
2.  Does initial underpricing boost post-IPO liquidity, or conversely, is it a compensation for 
after-market illiquidity and asymmetric information? 
3.  Provided that underpricing enhances after-market liquidity, is this effect temporary or 
permanent? A permanent effect would indicate that higher liquidity results from the broader 
ownership that underpricing helps to achieve (Booth and Chua’s theory), while a temporary 64 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
effect would only reflect that underpricing induces more interest from investors in the 
immediate post-IPO period. 
4.  Does underpricing result in lower post-listing asymmetric information because it attracts 
analysts’ coverage or, on the contrary, is it an increasing function of expected post-IPO 
adverse selection costs? 
5.  Finally, how does after-market liquidity impact long-run performance? 
 
Box A summarises the main conclusions of our empirical tests. 
Box A. Main findings on IPO performance and after-market liquidity 
1.  No difference in liquidity is found between book-built IPOs and other types of IPOs, with 
the exception that book-built IPOs’ after-market is narrower. 
2.  Our findings do not corroborate the theory according to which underpricing is a cost paid by 
the issuer to reduce post-IPO adverse selection and to ’purchase’ after-market liquidity. 
3.  Our findings validate the hypothesis that underpricing is a premium offered to primary 
market investors as a compensation for expected post-IPO information risk. 
4.  Initial underpricing produces higher turnover in the immediate after-market but has no 
effect on trading volumes after the first year of trading. 
5.  More traded IPO stocks have higher abnormal returns within the first year following 
primary listing but lower abnormal returns at the 3-year term, which indicates that investors 
assign more value to and require lower risk premia on stocks with higher trading volumes. 
These findings are based on a sample of 211 IPOs carried out on Euronext Paris between 1995 and 2004. 
 
2.1.  Performance and liquidity measures 
Measures of performance and liquidity used in our empirical work are presented hereafter. 
Liquidity measures are estimated on observation periods that start five days after the IPO date in 
order to eliminate the effect of abnormal volumes and liquidity generally observed in the first 
days following primary listing. 
Underpricing 
For each stock of the sample, underpricing is measured as the raw return observed over the first 
trading day: 
1
P
P
U
0
1 − =   (III.1),
where  1 P  is the closing price in the after-market and  0 P  is the IPO price. The IPO is 
underpriced (overpriced) when  0 U >  ( 0 U < ). 
Long-term performance 
We measure long-term performance over the first year and the first three years following the 
initial offering with cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) and wealth relative ratios (WR). A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 65 
 
For each stock of the sample, 
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where  t r  is the stock return on day t,  t I  is the SBF250 index return on day t, the first return  1 r  
is computed by taking the first closing price as the starting point,  Y 1 T  ( Y 3 T ) is the last trading 
day of the first year (first three years) of trading,  Y 3 T  is the last trading day of the first three 
years of trading,  Y 1 r  ( Y 3 r ) is the stock return over the first year (first three years) following the 
IPO,  Y 1 P  ( Y 3 P ) denotes the stock closing price one year (three years) after the IPO date. 
Liquidity and asymmetric information 
For the whole sample, post-IPO liquidity is measured with the average daily turnover, that is the 
average daily volume in percentage of the number of shares sold in the IPO, over the first six 
months of trading ( M 6 TURN ) and over the first three years of trading ( Y 3 TURN ). 
For IPO stocks that start continuous trading at the latest six months after the initial listing (93 
out of 211 securities), we compute duration-weighted average quoted spreads over the first six 
months of continuous trading, 
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and from the first day of continuous trading up until three years after the IPO, 
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k bid ,  k ask ,  k mid  and  k d  being respectively the best bid quote, the best ask quote, the mid 
quote and the duration of the best quotes observed at time k. We also calculate duration-
weighted average depth by reporting best bid and ask quantities to the number of shares sold in 
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Finally, we estimate Kyle’s (1985) liquidity-cost coefficient by reporting quoted spreads to their 
associated quantities in thousand euros: 
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This variable measures the marginal relative spread to pay to trade 1,000 euros in the stock 
immediately. 
Further, we estimate the magnitude of asymmetric information during the first six months of 
continuous trading with different methodologies. First, we implement Huang and Stoll’s (1997) 
‘two-way spread-decomposition methodology’ and divide the effective spread S in two 
components:  λ , the proportion of the spread representing order-processing costs, and () λ − 1 , 
the proportion of S corresponding to adverse selection and inventory-holding costs.  () λ − 1 S  is 
then used to proxy asymmetric information costs. 
Second, we estimate Hasbrouck’s (1991) α  coefficients, which measure the permanent impact 
of trades on quotes. It consists in estimating the asymmetric information cost by the permanent 
impact of trades on prices. If private information is contained in a trade, it must be inferred from 
the trade component which is unanticipated by the market. However, the immediate impact on 
prices of this trade innovation can contain not only information effects but also transient effects. 
To remove the transient effects from the impact, information asymmetry can be measured by the 
persistent impact of a trade innovation on prices. To estimate the permanent price impact of a 
one-unit unexpected volume, we use a bivariate model of mid-quote variations and signed 
volumes, in which quote revisions are a function of past quote revisions, past signed trading 
volumes, and public information. For each stock, we estimate the α  price impact coefficient for 
an unexpected traded quantity of 1,000 shares. 
2.2.  IPO allocation mechanism, underpricing and after-market liquidity 
As a preliminary test, we compare the average underpricing and liquidity of book-built and non 
book-built IPOs. Table 20 reports the results. They show that book-built IPOs are less 
underpriced than fixed-price and auctioned IPOs but less liquid. The difference in liquidity is 
not significant in turnover for the whole sample but it is significant at the 1% threshold with 
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Table 20. Underpricing and liquidity: book-built vs. non book-built IPOs 
   Book-built IPOs  Non book-built IPOs  Difference 
Mean 3.39%  9.64%  6.25%
** 
t-statistic ---  ---  2.073 
Std-dev 14.07%  22.64%  --- 
Underpricing: U 
Number 166  65  --- 
Mean 0.05996%  0.06388%  0.00392% 
t-statistic ---  ---  0.614 
Std-dev 0.0411%  0.0396%  --- 
Turnover: 
M 6 TURN  
Number 159  52  --- 
Mean 2.41%  1.56%  -0.85%
*** 
t-statistic ---  ---  -5.717 
Std-dev 1.17%  0.25%  --- 
Spread:  M 6 S  
Number 81  12  --- 
Mean 0.04%  0.08%  0.04%
*** 
t-statistic ---  ---  6.379 
Std-dev 0.03%  0.02%  --- 
Depth:  M 6 D  
Number 81  12  --- 
Mean 0.61%  0.04%  -0.57%
*** 
t-statistic ---  ---  -7.642 
Std-dev 0.68%  0.01%  --- 
Kyle’s coefficient: 
M 6 K  
Number 81  12  --- 
 
In order to investigate whether these differences result from the book-building allocation 
process or other characteristics of the firm and to analyse the link between underpricing and 
liquidity, we run a three stage multivariate analysis that combines logistic and OLS regressions 
in the Heckman style to avoid endogeneity biases. 
In a first stage, the probability that the firm chooses a book-building procedure to go public, 
denoted  () BB P , is modelled as a function of the issue size, the earnings-to-price ratio, the 
activity of the IPO market (hot or cold market) and the market segment (traditional or New 
Market): 
() 1 4 3 2 1 0
~ NM a HM a P / E a SIZE a a BB P ε + + + + + =   (III.12),
where SIZE is the logarithm of the issue size calculated as the number of shares on sale in the 
IPO multiplied by the subscription price,  P E /  denotes the earnings per share as a percentage 
of the IPO price, HM is a dummy that equals 1 for the years 1997-2000, 0 otherwise, and NM is 
a dummy equal to 1 for New Market IPOs. 
In a second stage, the probability for the issue to be underpriced,  ( ) 0 U P > , is modelled as a 
function of the IPO size, expected growth measured by the book-to-market ratio, the activity of 
the primary market, the industrial sector (new technologies vs traditional industries and 
services), the percentage of shares held by the managers after the IPO and the allocation 
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() ( ) 2 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
~ BB P ˆ b % MAN b NTIC b HM b BTM b SIZE b b 0 U P ε + + + + + + + = >   (III.13),
where BTM is the book-to-market ratio, NTIC is a dummy equal to 1 for new technologies 
firms, MAN% is the percentage of shares retained by the managers, and  () BB P ˆ  is the book-
building probability predicted by the model III.13. 
Last, in a third stage, turnovers are regressed on control variables comprising volatility, market 
value, and price level, as well as the book-building probability and the underpricing level: 
( ) 3 4 4 0 3 2 M 6 1 0 M 6
~ U ) 0 U ( P ˆ d BB P ˆ c P 1 c MV c c c TURN ε σ + × > + + + + + =   (III.14),
( ) 4 5 4 Y 3 3 2 Y 3 1 0 Y 3
~ U ) 0 U ( P ˆ d BB P ˆ d P 1 d MV d d d TURN ε σ + × > + + + + + =   (III.15),
where  M 6 σ  ( Y 3 σ ) is the closing price volatility over the first six months (three years) of 
trading, MV is the logarithm of the firm’s market value at the IPO date,  Y 3 P  is the average 
closing price over the first three years following the IPO,  U ) 0 U ( P ˆ × >  is the predicted value 
of the initial underpricing measured as the predicted probability from model (III.13) multiplied 
by the actual underpricing percentage. 
For IPO stocks that start continuous trading within six months of the initial listing, the 
relationship between liquidity and initial underpricing is also tested with spread and depth 
measures: 
( ) 5 5 4 0 3 2 M 6 1 0 M 6
~ U ) 0 U ( P ˆ e BB P ˆ e P 1 e MV e e e D ε σ + × > + + + + + =   (III.16),
( ) ( ) 7 4 4 0 3 M 6 2 M 6 1 0 M 6
~ U 0 U P ˆ g BB P ˆ g P 1 g TURN g g g S ε σ + × > + + + + + =   (III.17),
( ) ( ) 9 5 4 0 3 M 6 2 M 6 1 0 M 6
~ U 0 U P ˆ i BB P ˆ i P 1 i TURN i i i K ε σ + × > + + + + + =   (III.18).
The results are displayed in Table 21. 
First stage: Factors explaining the choice of book-building 
According to our estimates of regression (III.12), the firms of our sample that choose book-
building for their IPOs are bigger than others and less profitable with respect to their earnings-
to-price ratios. Book-building is found to be more popular in hot markets and on the New 
Market. All these findings are consistent with previous literature and expectations except the 
former, that is the positive link between IPO size and the book-building probability. This 
specific feature of our sample is probably the reason why we find book-built IPOs less 
underpriced, contrary to other studies. 
Second stage: Factors explaining underpricing 
The results for the Logit regression (III.13) indicate that the likelihood of underpricing 
decreases with respect to IPO size, expected growth and post-IPO managers’ shareholdings. 
Moreover, it is surprisingly lower in hot markets and for new technologies firms. Finally, the 
() BB P ˆ  coefficient is negative but not statistically different from zero, which means that, after 
controlling for size, growth opportunities, managers’ shareholdings, period and sector, we have 
found that book-built IPOs are no less frequently underpriced than other IPOs. This finding 
contrasts with previous studies and could result from the boom in the book-building method on 
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Table 21. Book-building, underpricing and after-market liquidity: regression results 
  () BB P   () 0 U P > M 6 TURN Y 3 TURN M 6 D   M 6 S   M 6 K  
Number of 
observations  231 227  211  207 93 93  93 
Regression type  Logit  Logit  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
intercept  -
33.756*** 
(0.000) 
11.861***
(0.004) 
-0.646 
(0.180) 
-5.266 
(0.108) 
0.319***
(0.000) 
2.557*** 
(0.000) 
0.136 
(0.644) 
SIZE  2.075*** 
(0.000) 
-0.567** 
(0.028) 
        
E/P  -15.306** 
(0.050) 
         
BTM    -1.808* 
(0.063) 
        
MAN%    -0.833* 
(0.078) 
        
HM  1.845*** 
(0.003) 
-2.161***
(0.000) 
        
NM  4.133*** 
(0.000) 
         
NTIC    -0.696* 
0.067) 
        
MV     0.054* 
(0.054) 
0.311 
(0.107) 
-
0.011***
(0.000) 
  
M 6 σ      0.142*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.002*
(0.066) 
0.185** 
(0.019) 
0.032 
(0.472) 
M 6 TURN            1.231*** 
(0.000) 
-0.375**
(0.011) 
0 P 1      -2.507***
(0.001) 
  0.038 
(0.595) 
11.243*** 
(0.003) 
10.960***
(0.000) 
Y 3 σ        0.281***
(0.002) 
   
Y 3 P 1        -4.508***
(0.009) 
   
() BB P ˆ     -0.625 
(0.362) 
-0.121 
(0.172) 
0.038 
(0.948) 
-
0.079***
(0.000) 
-0.808 
(0.139) 
-0.105 
(0.737) 
() U 0 U P ˆ × >      0.014*** 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.874) 
0.000 
(0.627) 
0.000 
(0.982) 
-0.002 
0.783 
Cox-Snell R²  47.3%  21.2%           
Adjusted R²      35.1%  4.8%  63.1%  32.6%  33.2% 
***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is significantly positive or negative respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. P-
values are reported in brackets. 
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Third stage: IPO mechanism, underpricing and after-market liquidity 
IPO mechanism and after-market liquidity 
The estimation of regressions (III.14), (III.15), (III.16), (III.17), and (III.18) show that, within 
six months of the initial issue: 
-  book-built IPOs are slightly less traded than non book-built IPOs but this effect disappears 
in the long run; 
-  book-built IPOs have slightly smaller spreads than non book-built IPOs; 
-  the after-market for book-built IPOs is not as deep as that for non book-built IPOs; 
-  Kyle’s coefficients, which report spreads to depth, are not different for book-built IPOs. 
The first two findings are worth mentioning because the P-values associated with the 
corresponding coefficients are relatively low; yet they exceed the non-rejection level of 10%. In 
contrast, the finding about depth is very significant and holds at the 1% level. Therefore, we 
conclude that, although the immediate after-market for book-built IPOs is not less liquid than 
that for fixed-price and auctioned IPOs, it is significantly tighter. Further, the initial offering 
mechanism is not a good indication of future turnover in the long run. 
Underpricing and after-market liquidity 
On our sample of continuously-traded IPO stocks, underpricing does not affect post-IPO 
spreads, depths or Kyle’s coefficients. Nevertheless, on our whole sample, turnover in the six 
months after the IPO is markedly higher for underpriced issues. This effect disappears in the 
long run: initial underpricing has no impact on average turnover over the three years following 
the issue. In the absence of a long-term relationship between underpricing and trading volumes, 
the higher turnover of underpriced IPOs immediately after the issue cannot be viewed as the 
consequence of a more diffuse ownership obtained by underpricing but as a reflection of higher 
post-IPO demand: 
-  underpriced stocks generate interest from investors and are consequently more traded than 
others; 
-  order-rationing is greater in underpriced issues and induces a larger demand for shares in 
the secondary market. 
2.3.  Underpricing and post-IPO information asymmetry 
We then use Huang and Stoll’s two-way decomposition method and Hasbrouck’s asymmetric 
information coefficients to examine how initial underpricing is related to post-IPO information 
asymmetry. To that end, we regress both proxies for adverse selection onto predicted 
underpricing after controlling for IPO size, and managers’ shareholding variation which we 
consider as a factor of information asymmetry between insiders and other shareholders. 
Table 22 displays the results and shows that, according to both measures, information 
asymmetry after the IPO is positively related to underpricing. This finding leads us to reject, for 
the French IPO market, the theory according to which underpricing is a means of reducing post-
IPO information asymmetry and to validate the hypothesis that underpricing is a reflection of 
not only information asymmetry at the time of the IPO but also expected post-IPO adverse 
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2.4.  After-market liquidity and long-run performance 
Our analysis of the link between post-IPO liquidity and long-term performance is based on the 
correlation matrix provided in Table 23. With regard to these correlations, we state that: 
-  as shown in sub-section 2.2, immediate post-IPO trading volume increases with 
underpricing but no significant relationship is found at the three-year term; 
-  no direct relationship is found between underpricing and long-term performance; 
-  IPO stocks that are highly traded in the six months following the initial offering perform 
better during the first year of trading but exhibit lower three -year returns; 
-  three-year average turnover is positively related 1
st year performance. 
A share price performing beyond expectations induces greater interest from investors and thus 
higher turnover. Investors require smaller illiquidity premia on stocks with high turnover, so 
that their prices rise in response to higher trading volumes, and in subsequent periods, these 
stocks exhibit lower abnormal returns, which reflects a lower cost of equity capital for their 
issuers in the long run. 
Table 22. Underpricing and post-IPO information asymmetry: regression results 
  () λ − 1 S   α  
Methodology  Huang and Stoll (1997)  Hasbrouck (1991) 
intercept  6.558** 
(0.016) 
1.696** 
(0.027) 
SIZE  -0.331** 
(0.032) 
-0.091** 
(0.038) 
MAN%  -0.198 
(0.520) 
-0.067 
(0.448) 
() U 0 U P ˆ × >   0.023** 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.198) 
Adjusted R²  14.1%  7.2% 
Number of observations  93  89 
***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is significantly positive or negative respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. P-
values are reported in brackets. The difference in sample sizes results from the fact that negative coefficients have 
been excluded from the regression of the Hasbrouck’s measure. 
 
Table 23. Underpricing, trading volumes and long-run performance: correlations 
 
M 6 TURN   Y 3 TURN   Y 1 CAR   Y 1 WR   Y 3 CAR   Y 3 WR  
U  0.248*** 
(0.000) 
[211] 
-0.027 
(0.697) 
[207] 
 -0.097 
(0.143) 
[231] 
-0.060 
(0.363) 
[231] 
 -0.066 
(0.320) 
[227] 
-0.040 
(0.550) 
[227] 
M 6 TURN   1 ---  0.198***
(0.004) 
[211] 
0.132* 
(0.056) 
[211] 
-0.201***
(0.004) 
[207] 
-0.131* 
(0.060) 
[207] 
Y 3 TURN   --- 1  0.329***
(0.000) 
[207] 
0.703***
(0.000) 
[207] 
0.050 
(0.473) 
[207] 
0.136** 
(0.050) 
[207] 
***, **, * indicate that the correlation is significantly different from 0 respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% threshold. P-
values are reported in brackets. The number of observations is given in square brackets. 72 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
2.5. Conclusion 
No difference in liquidity is found between book-built IPOs and other types of IPOs, with the 
exception that book-built IPOs’ after-market is narrower. Our findings do not corroborate the 
theory according to which underpricing is a cost paid by the issuer to reduce post-IPO adverse 
selection and to ‘purchase’ after-market liquidity, but validates the hypothesis that it is a 
premium offered to primary market investors as a compensation for expected post-IPO 
information risk. Initial underpricing produces higher turnover in the immediate after-market 
but has no effect on trading volumes after the first year of trading. More traded IPO stocks have 
higher abnormal returns within the first year following primary listing but lower abnormal 
returns at the three-year term, which indicates that investors assign more value to and require 
lower risk premia on stocks with higher trading volumes. However, among these conclusions, 
the latter one undoubtedly requires further investigation. 73 | 
General conclusion 
Based on a sample of 15 European countries, our survey analyses various features of the 
European IPO market over the past decade from 1995 to 2004: listing requirements, IPO-
mechanism choices, performance and secondary market liquidity. 
First, the comparison of national primary market regulations, in spite of the commonly observed 
segmentation between Main, Parallel and New Markets, shows a great diversity in listing 
requirements, and with the few exchanges that have stringent size requirements (such as 
Euronext Paris and Brussels until 2005, and the Milan Stock Exchange) at one end of the scale 
and the majority of exchanges for which the minimum-market-value requirement does not 
exceed five million euros at the other. Given the prospect of integrated European stock markets, 
it would be beneficial to go further than the enforcement of the Prospectus Directive and also 
harmonise basic primary listing requirements. In this respect, the consensus that we observed at 
a threshold between one and five million euros of minimal market size for a listing on a Main 
Market seems reasonable. Hence, the recent reform, undertaken by Euronext in 2005, that led to 
the merging of all Euronext regulated segments into a single list, called ‘Eurolist’, and removed 
the very high size requirements prevailing on the French and Belgian Premiers Marchés, has 
improved international integration. Besides, being able to compare growth markets sheds light 
on the opposition between the organised but unregulated segment of the LSE, AIM, and the 
continental regulated New Markets with sector restrictions, capital increase requirements and 
lock-up obligations. The decline, and the closure in some cases, of continental New Markets, 
and the success of AIM, where the number of candidate firms remained substantial after 2000, 
call for changes in the listing criteria and the reorganisation of growth markets. Euronext 
recently followed this path by closing its New Markets and opening Alternext, an organised and 
unregulated segment that will better address the specific needs of small- and mid-cap firms. 
Second, the survey of IPO mechanisms across Europe reveals that primary market organisation 
is almost always delegated to investment banks, which then control the initial pricing and 
allocation of new issues. Exceptions are Euronext Paris and the Istanbul Stock Exchange, which 
provide exchange-run fixed-price and tender offering mechanisms. The outsourcing of primary-
listing procedures to banks has resulted in a wide range of national terminologies which make 
cross-country comparison difficult. Examination of issuers’ practices in terms of IPO 
mechanisms highlights the equity boom of the late nineties and the current prominence of book-
building. With the disappearance of auctions on most exchanges book-building is often the only 
way for new issues to make their way into portfolios. The popularity of book-building can be 
explained by the many advantages that it provides issuers with: 
-  it permits the listing of small and risky firms that could probably not list otherwise; 
-  it is usually associated with firm commitment from the lead underwriter; 
-  the discretionary allocation power of the underwriter is a means of controlling post-listing 
ownership distribution. 
Nonetheless, book-building has been proved to be more costly in terms of placement fees and 
initial underpricing, and the discretionary allocation process is a controversial issue. For these 
reasons and because candidate firms have diverse profiles, primary markets should offer various 
procedures. More precisely, we believe that the provision of alternative mechanisms by 
exchanges, such as uniform-price ‘up-bounded’ auctions, would improve the competitiveness of 
primary markets and be complementary to the listing services offered by investment banks by 
diversifying the choices proposed to issuers and investors. 
Third, our empirical analysis of IPO short-term and long-term performance confirms, with a few 
exceptions, widely recognised patterns, but also show discrepancies between countries, periods, 
sector and primary listing mechanisms. In the short run, underpricing is observed in all countries 74 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
at all times but varies in level. Countries where underpricing is close to the mean are Poland, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Underpricing is relatively 
limited in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Turkey, with the lowest average 
initial returns in France and Turkey, while initial returns exceed the sample mean in Germany, 
Greece, and to a lesser extent Finland. New markets’ issues exhibit larger initial returns than 
those of Main and Parallel Markets. Underpricing varies across market cycles: it increases 
substantially during the hot market period 1998-2000 and then falls in the following cold market 
to levels observed in the eighties and the early nineties. In addition, the average difference in 
initial returns between traditional and growth segments nearly doubles during the hot issue 
period. The high level of underpricing on New Markets is likely driven by IPOs in new 
technologies. Among all sectors, new technology companies are the most underpriced. With 
regard to IPO mechanisms, issuers leave more money on the table with book-building than with 
other procedures. Converse to the theory, fixed-price offerings are the least underpriced. The 
high level of underpricing observed on the German market can be attributed to the high 
concentration of German IPOs in the hot issue period, in the Neuer Markt and in the new 
technology sector. In comparison, less money is left on the table by French and Turkish issuers 
as they use fixed-price and tender offers more frequently. France and Turkey are also 
characterised by a large proportion of IPOs in the traditional economy. 
Empirical evidence on long-term performance is less clear. Results are not benchmark-
dependent but sometimes differ between measurement methods. However, consistently with 
previous studies, significant underperformance is found at the 3-year horizon with all 
methodologies and in all countries, except Greece and Portugal. On average, New Markets 
underperform more in the long run than traditional markets, but this changes over time. New 
Markets IPOs prior to 1998 overperformed, with abnormal returns far above those of other 
IPOs, while, in contrast, New Markets’ IPOs undertaken after 1998 performed very poorly in 
comparison with traditional markets’ IPOs. This poor performance can be put down to the 
greater underperformance of NTIC firms. Finally, auctioned IPOs underperform less than 
others. 
Finally, our study on post-IPO liquidity shows that, on a sample of French IPOs between 1995 
and 2004, there is no difference in liquidity between book-built IPOs and other types of IPOs 
when controlling for volatility and other factors, with the exception that the book-built IPOs’ 
after-market is not as deep. Initial underpricing is related to higher turnover in the immediate 
after-market but has no effect on trading volumes after the first year of trading. Higher trade 
volumes in the six months following the issue are associated with higher abnormal returns 
within the first year following primary listing but lower abnormal returns at the three-year term, 
which indicates that investors probably require lower risk premia on stocks with higher trading 
volumes. Converse to American studies, we do not find any significant relationship between 
underpricing and spreads and measure a positive link between initial underpricing and after-
market asymmetric information. This finding, in accordance with those of Ellul and Pagano 
(2006) on the British market, contrasts with the patterns observed in the US. 
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Appendix 1. European IPO sample used in Part II 
We collected IPO dates and prices for 15 European countries from 1995 to 2004. Data were 
downloaded from the exchanges’ websites for Turkey and the UK. Data were available free of 
charge from Deutsche Börse for Germany, OMX for Sweden, Euronext Lisbon for Portugal, 
Bolsa de Madrid for Spain, Euronext Brussels for Belgium, Euronext Amsterdam for the 
Netherlands, the Warsaw Stock Exchange for Poland, the Helsinki Stock Exchange for Finland 
and the Vienna Stock Exchange for Austria. The Greek data was purchased from the Athens 
Stock Exchange. The Italian data was kindly provided by Professor Giancarlo Giudici. The 
Swiss data was built by matching several sources of information: data from Professor Dusan 
Isakov, data sent by the Swiss Exchange and information posted on the Swiss exchange’s 
website. 
Our sample selection resulted in an original sample of 3,406 issues, from which we excluded 
market segment transfers, double listings of companies on two or more exchanges, initial 
listings of foreign companies, and new listings of investment companies such as investment 
funds, real estate funds and financial holdings. We also excluded offerings corresponding to 
‘carve-outs’ and ‘spin-offs’. 
To calculate IPO market performance, daily closing prices were obtained from Thomson 
Financial Datastream. Some IPOs were deleted from the sample according to the following 
criteria: 
-  no data was available in Datastream for the firm; 
-  the Datastream price series started later than 1 month after the IPO date; 
-  the Datastream price series started more than 2 months prior to the IPO date; 
-  the ratio of the IPO price and the first Datastream closing price exceeded 5. 
The last filter was to avoid incorrect identifications of securities or currency in Thomson 
Financial Datastream but eliminated no more than 15 IPOs. 
These selection criteria produced a sample of 2,307 IPOs. Table A reports the distribution of 
these new listings between OTC and regulated markets. Since going public on an unregulated 
market segment, with the exception of AIM at the LSE, is not comparable to a regulated listing, 
all OTC segments but AIM were excluded from the analysis. Consequently, the definitive 
sample comprises 2,104 IPOs. The annual breakdown by country is reported in Table B. The 
distribution by market segment (Main and Parallel Markets vs growth markets) and economic 
sector is reported in Tables C and D respectively. 86 | JEAN-FRANÇOIS GAJEWSKI & CAROLE GRESSE  
Table A. Distribution of IPOs between regulated and OTC markets 
Country Regulated  segments  OTC  cna  Total 
Austria 23 0 --- 23 
Belgium --- --- 58 58 
Finland 44 4 --- 48 
France 363 183 --- 546 
Germany 415 0 --- 415 
Greece 183 0 --- 183 
Italy 135 0 --- 135 
Netherlands 47 3 --- 50 
Poland --- --- 95 95 
Portugal --- --- 16 16 
Spain 36 0 --- 36 
Sweden 95 13 --- 108 
Switzerland 61 0 --- 61 
Turkey 79 0 --- 79 
UK 123 331 --- 454 
Total 1,604 534 169 2,307 
cna: classification not available 
Table B. Final sample distribution by country per annum 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  Total 
A u s t r i a  4   1   4232501   1   2 3
B e l g i u m  0   2   1 1 1 3 1 77124   1   5 8
F i n l a n d  3   1   83 1 6 1 2010   0   4 4
France 14  43  52 104 59 66 17 7 0  1  363
Germany 16  7  20 54 150 144 18 2 0  4  415
Greece 12  14  10 21 30 46 15 15 11  9  183
Italy 11  11  9 14 25 41 16 4 4  dna  135
N e t h e r l a n d s  5   2   8 1 2 1 15111   1   4 7
P o l a n d  3   4   1 4 3 2 1 17515   1 3   9 5
P o r t u g a l  3   1   3323001   0   1 6
S p a i n  0   4   6894211   1   3 6
S w e d e n  8   8   1 7 1 0 2 3 1 6741   1   9 5
S w i t z e r l a n d  3   6   9 1 29 1 4610   1   6 1
T u r k e y  1 6   4   1 2 1 31 2 5032   3   7 9
UK dna  dna  dna 42 44 145 75 59 50  39  454
Total 98  108  183 343 410 537 168 101 81  75  2,104
dna: data not available A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN IPO MARKET | 87 
 
Table C. Final sample distribution by market segment 
Country  Traditional markets  Growth Markets  cna  Total 
Austria 23 0 ---  23 
Belgium --- --- 58  58 
Finland 29 15 ---  44 
France 218 145 ---  363 
Germany 107 308 ---  415 
Greece --- --- 183  183 
Italy 97 38 ---  135 
Netherlands 35 12 ---  47 
Poland 95 0 ---  95 
Portugal 0 0 16  16 
Spain 36 0 ---  36 
Sweden 9 86 ---  95 
Switzerland 49 12 ---  61 
Turkey --- --- 79  79 
UK 123 331 ---  454 
Total 821 947 336  2,104 
cna: classification not available 
Table D. Final sample distribution by economic sector 
Country Industry  Bank-
Insurance  NTIC  Other 
services  Unclassified Total 
Austria 10  2 4 6 1  23
Belgium 21  3 20 14 0  58
Finland 10  0 24 10 0  44
France 93  11 127 130 2  363
Germany 71  6 211 127 0  415
Greece 93  7 33 50 0  183
Italy 50  10 26 49 0  135
Netherlands 12  1 20 14 0  47
Poland 56  8 8 23 0  95
Portugal 4  1 4 7 0  16
Spain 18  0 2 16 0  36
Sweden 24  2 43 26 0  95
Switzerland 26  3 19 13 0  61
Turkey 47  5 5 22 0  79
UK 120  26 133 174 1  454
Total 655  85 679 681 4  2,104| 88 
Appendix 2. Euronext Paris IPO sample used in Part III 
We gathered and analysed the prospectuses available in the AMF database for the period 1995-
2004, that is 231 French IPO prospectuses. The following information was retrieved from the 
prospectuses: 
-  the IPO date and subscription price, 
-  the number of shares on sale in the IPO and the number of shares outstanding after the IPO, 
-  the IPO allocation mechanism, 
-  the firm’s earnings, 
-  the percentage of shares held by the managers before and after the IPO. 
In a second stage, we retrieved from Datastream post-IPO closing prices and book-to-market 
ratios. They were found for 227 stocks out of the initial sample. Last, we extracted high-
frequency data from Euronext CD-Roms for these stocks. The tick-by-tick data was available 
for 211 stocks, among which 93 started to be traded continuously within the six months 
following their initial listing. The remaining 118 stocks were traded in batch auctions only (two 
per  day). | 89 
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